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Chapter One 
General Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
It is estimated that each year between $20 billion and $40 billion are lost from the 
economies of developing countries as a result of political corruption.1 In Africa, corrupt 
practices, mostly by government officials, have facilitated illicit financial flows, which cost 
the continent more than $50 billion annually.2 This state of affairs raises fundamental 
questions about the management of senior government officials, also known as politically 
exposed persons (hereafter referred to as PEPs). 
The involvement of public officials in economic crimes comes with high-priced 
consequences for banks, the citizenry and the country in general. These consequences 
include economic crises due to bankruptcy, loss of investments, and sometimes civil unrest.3 
Banks and other financial institutions which unknowingly facilitate corrupt activity may incur 
heavy fines and a damaged reputation, and some may end up having to close their doors.4 
Also, the citizenry may begin to perceive all public officials as criminals. 
Various studies indicate that although corrupt PEPs are not the only cause of slow 
development, they have a significant impact in determining the pace of economic growth of 
any country.5 It is important, then, to understand who PEPs are, what risks they pose, what 
crimes they commit, and to what extent their criminal behaviour affects development at the 
domestic and international levels. 
  
                                                          
1 Report of UN Expert Group Meeting on Asset Tracing and Recovery (2012) 3. 
2 See Report of AU High Level Panel (2015). 
3 Bartlett (2002) 5. 
4 World-Check (2008) 9. 
5 World Bank World Development Indicators (2001). 
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1.2 Defining a Politically Exposed Person 
The notion of a PEP was developed by the international financial community in relation to 
the challenges posed by senior public officials for anti-money laundering laws (AML).6 There 
is no universally agreed definition of a PEP, but for the purposes of this research paper the 
FATF definition suffices. According to the FATF, the term makes reference to individuals 
entrusted with prominent public functions, such as former and current senior government 
officials, their family members, and close associates.7 However, this does not include 
middle-ranking and junior officials.8 There are three categories of senior government 
officials that may be classified as PEPs, as discussed below. 
 
1.2.1 Foreign PEPs 
A foreign PEP is an individual who is or has been entrusted with prominent public functions 
by a foreign country.9 This includes a head of a state or of government, a senior political, 
judicial or military official, a senior executive of a state-owned corporation, or a senior 
official of a political party.10 Foreign PEPs pose a high risk of transferring the proceeds of 
crime from their home states into the financial systems of other states.11 Such transnational 
transfers are done to avoid law enforcement agencies in their home states. 
 
1.2.2 Domestic PEPs 
A domestic PEP is an individual who is or has been entrusted domestically with prominent 
public functions.12 This includes a head of state or of government, a government minister, a 
senior political figure and a senior judicial or military officer.13 
  
                                                          
6 Chaikin & Sharman (2009) 83. 
7 See General Glossary to the FATF Recommendations 2012. 
8 See General Glossary to the FATF Recommendations 2012. 
9 See General Glossary to the FATF Recommendations 2012. 
10 See General Glossary to the FATF Recommendations 2012. 
11 FATF Guidance on PEPs (2013). 
12 See General Glossary to the FATF Recommendations 2012. 
13 See General Glossary to the FATF Recommendations 2012. 
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1.2.3 PEPs of International Organisations 
A PEP of an international organisation is a person who is or has been entrusted with a 
prominent function by such organisation.14 Such a person would be part of the management 
of the organisation, for example, directors, deputy directors and board members.15 
 
1.2.4 Family Members and Close Associates 
The idea of a PEP encompasses family members and close associates. Family members are 
related to PEPs directly by consanguinity or through marriage or another civil form of 
partnership.16 Close associates are not family, but are closely connected to a PEP socially or 
professionally.17 Both family members and close associates become persons of concern 
because PEPs usually make use them to launder money. 
 
1.3 Risks Posed by PEPs 
PEPs, by virtue of their public positions, are susceptible to economic criminality in the 
absence of strict and proper regulations. Their access to public funds and assets creates 
opportunities for corruption and other crimes, making them potential holders of illicit 
funds.18 To avoid drawing the attention of law enforcement agencies and the general public 
as holders of illicit funds, corrupt PEPs will resort to money laundering in an effort to “clean” 
the funds.19 
A considerable number of PEPs have been involved in economic crimes such as tax fraud, 
forgery, election fraud, theft, corruption and money laundering. The quintessential 
examples include: Ferdinand Marcos, former president of the Philippines, who laundered 
illicit funds into offshore bank accounts, causing huge losses to the Philippines 
                                                          
14 See General Glossary to the FATF Recommendations 2012. 
15 See General Glossary to the FATF Recommendations 2012.  
16 FATF Guidance on PEPs (2013) 5. 
17 FATF Guidance on PEPs (2013) 5. 
18 FATF Report (2003-2004) 19. 
19 FATF Report (2003-2004) 19. 
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government;20 Sani Abacha, former president of Nigeria, who used a state-run vaccination 
scheme to launder money from Nigeria;21 and General Augusto Pinochet, former president 
of Chile, who hid his illicit funds with Riggs Bank in the United States.22 
The fact that some PEPs engage in criminal activity, however, does not mean that every 
person holding a prominent government position is a criminal. In fact, the main aim of the 
PEP concept, as part of AML, is to alert financial institutions to the kind of clients with whom 
they are dealing, so that they may conduct enhanced scrutiny of such clients and prevent 
abuse of the financial system.23 The risk associated with PEPs relates primarily to corruption 
and laundering of the proceeds of corruption. It is fitting, then, to examine these two 
crimes. 
 
1.3.1 PEPs and Corruption 
There are several definitions of corruption. According to the World Bank corruption is “the 
abuse of public office for private gain”.24 This definition, however, is criticised for not 
including private sector corruption.25 A broader definition of corruption has been 
formulated by Transparency International, namely, “the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain”.26 Generally, at the heart of any corruption definition there ought to be an 
abuse of a position, whether public or private, that gives unfair advantage to an individual.27 
PEPs are especially susceptible to corruption because of the possibility that they may abuse 
their position and influence to carry out such corrupt acts as accepting and extorting bribes, 
misappropriating state assets and embezzlement.28 
 
                                                          
20 Chaikin &Sharman (2009a) 27-45. 
21 Joyce (2005) 82. 
22 Simons (2013) 255-256. 
23 Greenberg et al (2010) 3. 
24 World Bank (1997) 8. 
25 Chaikin & Sharman (2009) 8. 
26 Transparency International-What is Corruption?, available at http://www.transparency.org/what-is-
corruption (accessed on 10 May 2015). 
27 Johnston (2005) 11-12. 
28 FATF (2011) 16. 
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Damage caused by corrupt PEPs can have a serious socio-economic impact upon a 
country.29 An act of corruption by a single PEP could result in the loss of millions, or even 
billions, to the extent of affecting the national budget. For example, the brother of former 
Mexican president Carlo Salina acquired approximately $120 million as a result of 
corruption. The World Bank estimated that this amount was sufficient to pay for the annual 
health care of more than 594000 Mexican citizens.30 Similarly, the U4 Anti- Corruption 
Resource Centre reported that 25 per cent of the GDP of African states is lost to corruption 
every year.31 Such losses, damage the economies of these African states significantly. 
Moreover, corruption by PEPs affects the global financial system. This is because corruption 
transcends state borders to distort the world economy.32 Kofi Annan, former United Nations 
Secretary General, captured the major effects of corruption well in a speech on the 
adoption of the UNCAC in 2003. An important part of his speech reads as follows: 
“Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for 
development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding 
inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid.”33 
 
1.3.2 PEPs and Money Laundering 
Money laundering is a process of disguising the illicit origin of assets or funds.34 The process 
involves three stages. First is the placement stage, at which proceeds of crime are placed in 
the financial system through such avenues as bank deposits, smuggling into safe havens, 
and trust accounts.35 Second is the layering stage, which involves a series of transactions 
that move the proceeds of crime within the financial system through legitimate accounts, 
thus separating them from their illicit origin.36 Third is the integration stage, during which 
the proceeds of crime are invested in assets or other legitimate businesses.37 
                                                          
29 See UNDOC Global Study on the Transfer of Funds of Illicit Origin (2002). 
30 World Development Indicators (2001) 99. 
31 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (2007). 
32 Mauro (1998) 12. 
33 Speech of the Secretary-General on The adoption of the Convention against Corruption, available at 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/secretary-general-speech.html(accessed 
on 11 May 2015). 
34 Unger (2007) 15. 
35 Unger (2007) 89-91. 
36 Unger (2007) 93-100. 
37 Unger (2000)101-103. 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
PEPs are considered to carry a high money laundering risk because of the possibility that 
they may use the domestic and international financial systems to launder criminal 
proceeds.38 The Nyanga Declaration on the Recovery and Repatriation of Africa’s Wealth 
points out that the actions of corrupt PEPs are futile without their having the ability to 
disguise and move the proceeds of the crime.39 
 
1.3.3 Money Laundering Typologies Employed by PEPs 
Money laundering patterns among corrupt PEPs are not very different from other money 
launderers. PEPs also have used the domestic and international financial system to launder 
criminal proceeds, mainly through banks.40 Overtime, however, new methods emerged and 
these involved using family members and close associates in complex business 
arrangements such as corporate vehicles and trusts.41 In some cases, corrupt PEPs have 
utilised the services of gatekeepers such as lawyers and accountants, and have used real 
estate, insurance, precious metal, jewels and art to launder corrupt proceeds.42 The impact 
of money laundering is summarised as follows in the Global Study on the Transfer of Funds 
of Illicit Origin: 
“The exporting of funds derived from corruption has a number of severe consequences 
for the country of origin. It undermines foreign aid, drains currency reserves, reduces 
the tax base, harms competition, undermines free trade and increases poverty levels. 
Corruption and laundering can therefore operate in tandem to limit every advance 
(social, economic or political) of countries, especially developing countries and countries 
with economies in transition.”43 
  
                                                          
38 FATF (2012) 8-9.  
39 Nyanga Declaration 2001, available at 
http://ww1.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2001/nyanga_declaration.html (accessed on 7 
April 2015). 
40 FATF (2011) 18-19. 
41 FATF (2011) 18-19. 
42 FATF (2011) 20. 
43 See Global Study on The Transfer of Funds of Illicit Origin (2002). 
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1.4 Initiatives to Manage PEPs 
 
1.4.1 International Initiatives 
At the international level, efforts aiming at limiting the risks posed by PEPs include the 
adoption of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003.44 Similar 
efforts were undertaken by intergovernmental bodies. For example, the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) issued recommendations on enhanced due diligence for PEPs.45 In 
response to the FATF recommendations, in 2005 the European Union issued the Third Anti-
Money Laundering Directive (3rd AMLD) to address the PEP challenge.46 
Other institutions are concerned actively with PEPs. For example, in 2001 the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision provided guidelines for distinct customer due diligence 
for PEP s.47 In a similar initiative, the Wolfsberg Group of Banks issued a guidance on PEPs in 
2003, which was revised in 2008.48 
These international strategies essentially require states to include PEP management 
measures in their domestic legal frameworks.49 Banks and other financial institutions are 
required to adopt a risk-based approach when doing business with PEPs.50 This approach 
encompasses the know-your-customer (KYC) procedures, and the application of enhanced 
due diligence to PEPs as high risk customers.51 Steps to be taken include identifying the 
sources of income of such clients as well as seeking senior management approval for 
establishing a business relationship with them, and conducting on-going monitoring of their 
accounts.52 
 
                                                          
44 Articles 2(1), 2(3) & 52 of UNCAC. 
45 Recommendations 10, 12 & 22. 
46 Chaikin & Sharman (2009) 83. 
47 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Customer Due Diligence for Banks (2001), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf(accessed on 31 March 2015). 
48 Wolfsberg AML Principles, available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com (accessed on 31 March 
2015). 
49 Articles 2(1), 2(3)&52 of UNCAC. 
50 See FATF Guidance on PEPs (2013). 
51 Choo (2008) 375. 
52 Chaikin & Sharman (2009) 105. 
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1.4.2 Domestic Initiatives 
The international efforts were accompanied by measures at the domestic level. Various 
countries enacted legislation in compliance with the global AML standards. An example of 
this is the South African Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA), which was enacted in 
2001.53 
Notwithstanding the legal developments at the international and domestic levels, effective 
implementation of the PEP requirements remains a worldwide challenge. The Stolen Assets 
Recovery Initiative (StAR) report on compliance with the PEP requirements revealed 
implementation deficits in many jurisdictions.54 This shortfall was due to the lack of an 
enforceable legal or regulatory framework, lack of political will, variations in international 
standards, and technical challenges, including the challenge of defining a PEP.55 In the light 
of these findings, further research is needed in this area to find solutions to the PEP 
challenge. 
 
1.5 Statement of the Problem 
Tanzania is a developing country located in East Africa.56 Its geographical location makes the 
country a potential route for human and drug trafficking.57 Also, wildlife and natural forest 
reserves attract illegal activities such as poaching and logging, which generate dirty 
money.58 Proceeds of crime enter the financial system through uncontrolled cash 
transactions.59 This is possible because the country’s economy is largely cash-based, as a 
result of which money laundering activities are difficult to detect.60 
                                                          
53 Financial Intelligence Centre Act No 38 of 2001. 
54 Greenberg et al (2010) 7-8. 
55 Greenberg et al (2010) 13-19. 
56 World Map/Tanzania Map/Where is Tanzania, available at 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/tanzania/tanzania-location-map.html (accessed on 10 May 2015). 
57 UNODC (2013) 19-24. 
58 Mniwasa (2004) 48. 
59 ESAAMLG (2009) 14. 
60 ESAAMLG (2009) 14. 
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To cope with these vulnerabilities, parliament enacted a number of laws. The earliest of 
these is the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1991,61 which introduced the term money laundering 
into the Tanzanian legal system. Following the adoption of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crimes (UNTOC),62 the Bank of Tanzania issued a circular 
that required banks and financial institutions to report any suspicious transactions to it.63  
This was followed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AML Act),64 enacted in 2006 and 
revised in 2012.65 With regard to corruption, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
Act was enacted in 2007,66 in compliance with UNCAC and the African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
These legislative developments are supported by statutory institutions such as the Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) and the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB). 
Generally, these two regulatory bodies deal with money laundering and corruption 
respectively. They are complemented by other responsible agencies, including the Bank of 
Tanzania, the police force, the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the 
office of the Controller and Auditor General (CAG). 
However, the fight against money laundering and corruption remains challenging. For 
example, Tanzania has experienced several crimes committed by public officials who fall 
within the PEP category. Such crimes include illicit enrichment, embezzlement and money 
laundering.67 With regard to AML compliance, the current laws provide for banks and 
financial institutions as active enforcers of the PEP requirements.68 To a large extent, 
however, they are not successful in dealing with PEPs.69 What is more, the applicable 
legislation is deficient. For example, the Anti-Money Laundering Act recognises only foreign 
                                                          
61 Proceeds of Crime Act No 256 of 1991. 
62 Adopted on 15 November 2000. 
63 Circular No 8 of 2002. 
64 Anti-Money Laundering Act No 423 of 2006. 
65 Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act of 2012. 
66 Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act No 11 of 2007. 
67 Tanzania Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption (2014), available at 
http://transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/country_profile_Tanzania2014.pdf (accessed on 29 
March 2015). 
68 Section 15(b) of the AML Act. 
69 ESAAMLG (2009) 17. 
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PEPs, while domestic PEPs continue unchecked.70 Needless to say, persons holding senior 
government posts may be tempted to use these weaknesses to their own advantage. 
Over the last few years, several corruption scandals have haunted the Tanzanian 
government. These include the multi-billion financial scandals facing the Bank of Tanzania, 
the Radar saga, the Richmond scandal, suspicious mining contracts, and many others.71 
Following such events, citizens, media groups, non-governmental organisations and 
parliamentarians began to question the fiscal integrity of the government. 
Serious allegations have been raised about the involvement of senior state officials in most 
of these scandals. For example, in 2014 the CAG's report revealed suspicious transactions 
from several banks involving senior public officials and politicians.72 The enhanced due 
diligence requirement was not adhered to in these transactions.  Furthermore, a large 
amount of cash was paid to these officials, without the FIU being informed about the 
transaction, as required by the law.73 
The prevalence of corrupt activities among state officials has led to the loss of very large 
amounts of money through capital flight, tax losses, misallocation of resources and 
investment losses. Such losses undermine the country's development goals. For example, in 
2013 it was estimated that twenty per cent of Tanzania development funds were lost to 
corruption.74 With a situation like this, the alleviation of poverty, the provision of sufficient 
health care and education services, and the development of good infrastructure seem 
unachievable. This is a tragic misfortune for a country that is blessed with abundant 
resources and wealth. 
                                                          
70 Section 3 of the AML Act. 
71 Onyango Emmanuel ‘Bird’s eye view of corruption scandals in Tanzania’, available at 
http://eonyango.blogspot.com/2008/06/birds-eye-view-of-corruption-scandals.html(accessed on 12 
May 2015). 
72 See the CAG Report (2014). 
73 See the CAG Report (2014). 
74 The Guardian reporter, 9th June 2013, ‘Corruption eats up 20pc of govt budget’, available at 
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=55684(accessed on 14 May 2015). 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Hitherto, the government’s response to the crisis has been slow. Only a few public officials 
have been prosecuted.75 Also, there is little success in the tracing of corruption proceeds.76 
This suggests that most corruption proceeds are laundered successfully, and thus become 
extremely difficult to recover. 
Against this background, it has to be concluded that there remain gaps in the country’s legal 
and institutional anti-corruption framework.77 The fact that illegal activities are carried out 
with the help of senior government officials poses a serious crisis of integrity for the 
government of Tanzania. It is also a sign that there is a dire need to examine critically the 
issue of PEPs in Tanzania. 
This study, therefore, examines the relevant strategies against corrupt PEPs under the 
Tanzanian regime and assesses them against the relevant provisions of UNCAC and the 
relevant FATF recommendations. This is done with a view to understanding how the current 
domestic framework dealing with PEPs operates, and to suggesting improvements where 
necessary. 
The study relies upon UNCAC because it is the only international convention that directly 
addresses the PEP problem.78 Unlike the other instruments, UNCAC covers not only 
corruption but also money laundering,79 the two crimes usually associated with PEPs. Also, 
the UNCAC provisions on money laundering are more extensive than those in other anti-
corruption conventions.80 The FATF recommendations have been chosen because they are 
considered as the global AML standards.81 
The study addresses both anti-corruption and anti-money laundering measures. In many 
jurisdictions strategies against corrupt PEPs are failing because they are centred on the AML 
                                                          
75 Corruption, Tanzania – Is the war against Corruption in Tanzania joke? available at 
http://dgtlubun2.tumblr.com/post/68744406183/is-the-war-against-corruption-in-tanzania-a-
joke(accessed on 15 May 2015). 
76 allAfrica.com: Tanzania: EPA Scandal - No Trace of Tsh 90 Billion, available 
athttp://allafrica.com/stories/200807310099.html(accessed 15 May 2015). 
77 Bagenda (2003) 51. 
78 Article 52 of UNCAC. 
79 Para 2 of the Preamble to UNCAC and Articles 14, 23, 52 & 58 of UNCAC. 
80 See Comparative Analysis: SADC Protocol against Corruption, AU Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption, UN Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Other/CorruptHandbookNov04/Contents.html (accessed on 3 June 
2015). 
81 Blair & Brent (2008) 88. 
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regime. This approach fails to acknowledge that the criminality of PEPs goes beyond money 
laundering. An AML regime will detect and deter laundering activities, but will do little to 
prevent and fight corruption. An effective PEP control regime, therefore, must combine 
anti-corruption and anti-money laundering measures. 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
The basic research question is whether the Tanzanian laws relevant to PEPs are adequate? If 
this question is resolved in the negative, what needs to be done to remedy the 
inadequacies? 
 
1.7 Scope of the Research 
The study is focused on Tanzania mainland only. This is because a different legal framework 
exists in Zanzibar with respect to the research problem. Reference is made sometimes to 
other jurisdictions such the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa, because 
these countries are regarded as having relatively comprehensive PEP regulations as 
compared to others. However, the study does not constitute a comparative analysis. These 
countries are mentioned only by way of example. 
 
1.8 Methodology 
This research is a qualitative desktop study, which will rely on both primary and secondary 
sources. It analyses these sources closely and critically in order to develop answers to the 
research questions. 
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1.9 Chapter outline 
The study consists of five chapters. The content of the remaining chapters is described 
below. 
Chapter Two 
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the international approach to PEPs in relation to 
economic criminality. It deals with the relationship between international measures to 
combat corruption under UNCAC and the PEP management regime under the FATF 
recommendations. This chapter examines these provisions, with the view to seeing how the 
anti-money laundering and anti-corruption frameworks can work together in dealing with 
PEPs. 
Chapter Three 
This chapter addresses the two research questions directly. It examines the legal regime in 
Tanzania insofar as PEPs are concerned, with a view to assessing its adequacy. 
Chapter Four 
This chapter examines the role supervisory bodies, regulatory authorities, law enforcement 
agencies, and other relevant institutions tasked with implementation of legislative measures 
against corrupt PEPs and the implementation challenges faced by these institutions. 
Chapter Five 
This chapter includes general concluding comments and recommendations emerging from 
the research. 
 
1.10 Concluding Remarks 
In summary, the evolution of the PEPs concept under the international legal framework was 
associated largely with anti-money laundering strategies aimed at regulating senior public 
officials who, from the experience of most countries, were especially susceptible to 
corruption and money laundering schemes. The economic criminality of PEPs has 
demonstrated a connection between the offences of corruption and money laundering. Any 
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PEP management strategy, therefore, must combine both anti-corruption and anti-money 
laundering measures. With regard to the challenges Tanzania still faces in the fight against 
money laundering and corruption, one of the most problematic areas is compliance with the 
PEPs requirements. The following chapter examines international laws and standards 
regulating PEPs. 
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Chapter Two 
International Legal Framework for Managing PEPs 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the relationship between the measures to combat corruption in 
UNCAC and the PEP requirements in the FATF recommendations. These are examined with a 
view to understanding how the anti-money laundering framework and the anti-corruption 
framework can be used in tandem to deal with corrupt PEPs. 
 
2.2 United Nations Convention against Corruption 
UNCAC is considered to be the most comprehensive global instrument against corruption.1  
As of April 2015, 177 states had ratified the Convention.2 Although UNCAC generally covers 
international standards for an effective anti-corruption regime, its provisions are also 
important for an effective AML regime. The Convention calls for domestic measures and 
international co-operation in preventing PEPs from abusing the international financial 
systems. This is emphasised in the Preamble which proclaims that states parties to the 
Convention are “determined to prevent, detect and deter in a more effective manner 
international transfers of illicitly acquired assets’’.3 
Furthermore, UNCAC includes a wide range of measures that are relevant in formulating 
strategies for managing PEPs. The Convention includes preventive measures on addressing 
                                                          
1 Lee (2010) 816. 
2 Signatories to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, available at 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (accessed on 24 June 2015). 
3 Para 8 of the Preamble to UNCAC. 
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corruption in the public sector,4 criminalisation of corruption5 and international co-
operation in the tracing and recovery of assets.6 
 
2.3 Preventing Corruption 
Preventive measures form an important dimension of anti-corruption strategies,7 since it is 
more effective to prevent corruption than to enforce reactive measures when it may be too 
late to mitigate the damage.8 UNCAC contains various preventive measures that focus on 
public officials, including PEPS. These include transparency in public office, public finances 
and public procurement. All these provide guidance on how to develop an effective PEP 
management regime. 
 
2.3.1 PEPs and Public Office 
UNCAC requires states parties to devise adequate procedures for the selection and training 
of individuals for public positions that are especially vulnerable to corruption.9 In addition, 
states parties are required to enhance the awareness of such individuals on the risks of 
corruption inherent in their function.10 This requirement is relevant to PEPs because their 
positions are especially vulnerable to corruption.11 
A system of training PEPs on the vulnerabilities associated with their positions is important 
for two reasons. First, the system acknowledges the realities of corruption in the public 
sector and the amount of power that PEPs hold in controlling the success or failure of 
mechanisms for preventing corruption in the public sector. Second, understanding the risk 
creates self-awareness for the PEP involved, motivating him to not to exceed his legitimate 
activities because he knows how sensitive the system is to corrupt activities. 
                                                          
4 Chapter 2 of UNCAC. 
5 Chapter 3 of UNCAC. 
6 Chapter 5 of UNCAC. 
7 Doig (2012) 3-10. 
8 Doig (2012) 3. 
9 Article 7(1)(b) of UNCAC. 
10 Article 7(1)(d) of UNCAC. 
11 FATF (2004) 19. 
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Furthermore, states parties are required to put in place institutional measures that aim at 
preventing abuse of powers. To achieve this, UNCAC calls upon states parties to apply codes 
of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper performance of public functions.12 Codes 
of conduct can function as an effective tool for preventing corruption among PEPs. 
However, they cannot be effective where they are not embraced by the officials to whom 
they apply.13 It is recommended, therefore, that such codes should be developed through a 
process of consultation, or they can be attached to the employment contract.14 Regular 
awareness initiatives are also essential for implementing codes of conduct.15 Unfortunately, 
this provision is not mandatory, giving states parties discretion as to whether to implement 
it or not. 
In addition, it is important for states to put in place measures to address conflicts of 
interests. In this respect, UNCAC calls upon states parties to establish declaration systems 
for assets, gifts, benefits, employment and other outside activities.16 Such a disclosure 
system preferably should cover officials of a certain level of seniority and officials most 
vulnerable to corruption.17 
It is ideal for PEPs to disclose their assets because the tradition of gift-giving is part of their 
everyday functions, but these gifts may be used to camouflage bribes.18 Also, PEPs may have 
private interests that may affect their loyalty to their public duties. Moreover, PEPs may 
conceal illegally obtained assets with the help of their relatives or friends. In this case, states 
parties should consider applying disclosure requirements to such persons too.19 
A disclosure system acts as a tool for the prevention of corruption and the enforcement of 
anti-corruption measures.20 It promotes transparency and accountability by providing 
guidance to officials about the principles of ethical conduct in public office, and serves as a 
                                                          
12 Article 8(2) (a) of UNCAC. 
13 UNCAC Legislative Guide (2012) para 14. 
14 UNCAC Legislative Guide (2012) para 14. 
15 UNCAC Legislative Guide (2012) para 19. 
16 Articles 7(4) & 8(5) of UNCAC. 
17 UN Anti-Corruption Tool Kit (2004) 251. 
18 Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 92& 110. 
19 UN Anti-Corruption Tool Kit (2004) 252. 
20 StAR (2012) 1. 
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reminder that their behaviour is subject to scrutiny.21 Furthermore, a disclosure system 
provides a means for obtaining evidence in the investigation and prosecution of corruption 
cases.22 Hence, the provision must be considered seriously when states parties develop 
strategies to manage PEPs. 
A practical example of the role of assets disclosure in detecting corruption and money 
laundering is found in the case of United States v Randall Cunningham.23 Cunningham was a 
United States congressman and a member of the Appropriations Committee that developed 
military budgets. His duties gave him significant influence in the budgeting process. On 
several occasions, the congressman accepted bribes from contractors, which he used to 
purchase a number of assets. Investigators obtained records from his assets disclosure form 
that indicated a sudden rise in his income. In this form he had listed also a corporation that 
he used to accept the bribe money. This enabled the investigators to link the bribe money 
with the congressman. As a result Cunningham was sentenced to eight years imprisonment 
and ordered to pay $1.8 million in restitution for fraud, conspiracy to commit bribery and 
tax evasion. 
 
2.3.2 PEPs and Public Procurement 
Public procurement is an area of concern in any anti-corruption programme because of its 
complex and bureaucratic nature.24 Public procurement involves several activities, including 
planning, advertising, bidding, awarding of contracts, and the whole process offers many 
opportunities for corruption.25 The process may present an opportunity for money 
laundering through under-pricing and over-pricing, while lack of transparency and high 
levels of competitiveness can lead to corrupt practices in securing contracts.26 Here, PEPs 
also come into play, as they hold positions that influence procurement decisions. 
                                                          
21 StAR (2012) 7. 
22 FATF Report (2012) 26. 
23 United States v Randall Cunningham Case No o5-cr-2137 (2006). 
24 OECD (2007) 9-19. 
25 See UN (2010). 
26 FATF (2012) 18. 
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Some of the high-risk public procurement areas include the defence industry, the extraction 
industry, the health sector and infrastructure projects.27 Several PEPs have been linked to 
corruption in respect of the activities mentioned. For example, in the case of Attorney 
General of Zambia v Meer Care,28 the then President of Zambia and the Director of Zambia 
Security Intelligence Service embezzled in excess of $70 million from the country’s treasury 
through contracts with a Bulgarian Company for the purchase of military equipment. The 
purchase was a disguise through which money was siphoned from the state treasury to 
accounts held by the President and his associates and no arms were delivered ever. 
UNCAC recognises the nature of and vulnerabilities in the public procurement process. Thus, 
it requires states parties to establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on 
transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision-making that are effective in 
preventing corruption.29 This is a mandatory requirement, qualified with a reservation in 
favour of domestic law. 
Transparency is also an important factor in fighting illicit financial flows (IFFs).  The AU High 
Level Panel Report notes that non-transparent government procurement and supply chains 
can provide opportunities for corruption-related IFFs.30 To fight IFFs, therefore, states 
parties are called upon to domesticate the provisions of UNCAC and other regional 
instruments.31 The Report further recommends that states parties ensure public access to 
national budget information, budget development and the auditing process.32 These 
measures are important to avoid abuse of discretionary powers by PEPs who hold political 
influence in the procurement area. 
 
2.3.3 Measures to Strengthen the Judiciary 
UNCAC provides for measures to combat corruption in the judiciary, which measures cover 
judicial staff and judges. Judges are particularly important because they are considered to 
                                                          
27 FATF (2012) 20. 
28 Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care [2007] EWHC 952. 
29 Article 9(1) of UNCAC. 
30 AU High Level Panel Report (2015) 83. 
31 AU High Level Panel Report (2015) 69. 
32 AU High Level Panel Report (2015) 83. 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
be PEPs.33 Additionally, a corruption-free judiciary plays a crucial role in dealing with cases 
that involve corrupt PEPs, since said PEPs may seek to exert undue external influence on the 
judiciary, thereby hampering efforts to combat corruption.34 For example, the former Prime 
Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, and his attorney, Cesare Previti, were indicted in 1999 for 
allegedly bribing judges to obtain judgments in favour of Berlusconi.35 This incident 
demonstrates how corrupt practices in the judiciary undermine effective PEP management. 
UNCAC requires member states to take measures to strengthen the integrity of the judiciary 
and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary.36 This is a 
mandatory provision. States parties may take steps such as putting in place rules with 
respect to the appointment and conduct of members of the judiciary and, where such 
measures are in place, states parties should assess whether they fulfil the requirements of 
UNCAC.37 Furthermore, members of the judiciary are required to be independent and 
accountable to the general public.38 Therefore, transparency measures for the judiciary 
form an integral part of PEP management. 
 
2.4 Criminalisation 
PEPs obtain illicit wealth from various corrupt activities including bribery, embezzlement, 
and other corruption offences.39 Thus, it is important to examine the types of corruption 
offences committed by PEPs, so as to identify areas which are vulnerable to corruption.40 
Furthermore, an examination of the offences sheds light on the sources of proceeds 
laundered by PEPs. This provides a foundation for the development of a realistic approach 
to PEPs and economic criminality in the domestic framework. 
 
                                                          
33 See General Glossary to the FATF Recommendations 2012. 
34 Terracino (2012) 153. 
35 Nelken (2002) 114. 
36 Article 11(1) of UNCAC. 
37 UNCAC Legislative Guide (2012) para 103. 
38 Schultz (2009) 2. 
39 FATF (2003-2004) 19. 
40 UNODC (2015) 5. 
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2.4.1 Bribery 
UNCAC obliges states parties to criminalise active and passive bribery of national public 
officials, foreign public officials and officials of international organisations.41 The Convention 
contains a mandatory requirement on criminalising bribery of national public officials,42 but 
uses permissive language in respect of bribery of foreign public officials and officials of 
public international organisations.43 The variations in the provisions are a result of 
negotiations over jurisdictional issues and state sovereignty.44 Be that as it may, 
comprehensive criminalisation of bribery is important for regulating PEPs, whether domestic 
or foreign, because they pose the same risks of corruption. 
There are several bribery incidents linked to PEPs. For example, in 2010 Alcatel, a French 
electronics company, paid bribes to Costa Rican government officials to secure contracts. 
These bribes were paid also to the President Miguel Rodriguez, prompting legal action 
against him in 2011, as a result of which he was convicted of receiving a sum of $800 000 
corruptly.45 Similarly, Sanjaya Bahel, chief of commodity procurement at the UN 
procurement division, was found guilty, among other things, of receiving financial benefits 
to secure contracts for companies owned by the Kholi family in several UN projects.46 
 
2.4.2 Diversion of Property 
UNCAC requires states parties to criminalise embezzlement, misappropriation or other 
diversion of property by a public official.47 Generally, these offences cover acts of 
intentionally converting public assets for private advantage, including any third party 
advantage. An important aspect of these offences is that the property must be entrusted to 
the public official by virtue of his position. 
                                                          
41 Articles 15 & 16 of UNCAC. 
42 Article 15 of UNCAC. 
43 Article 16 of UNCAC. 
44 UNCAC Travaux Preparatoires (2010) 61& 159. See also Article 4 of UNAC. 
45 StAR- Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative-Corruption Cases, available at 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/corruption-
cases/files/documents/arw/Acusacion_Rodriguez.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2015). 
46 Docket No. 08–3327–cr. 
47 Article 17 of UNCAC. 
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Most PEPs are entrusted with public assets. Thus, presidents and ministers routinely have 
access to the national treasury and government accounts which are available for looting. In 
Equatorial Guinea, for example, President Obiang took full control of the national treasury in 
2003, justifying the action as a measure to combat internal corruption, but then used this 
opportunity to embezzle state funds.48 
Another example is the former President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, who 
embezzled money from the national treasury and government financial institutions, and 
diverted foreign aid international assistance into his private accounts.49 In the light of these 
examples, it is important for states parties to criminalise such corrupt practices as part of 
their domestic PEP management regime. 
 
2.4.3 Trading in Influence and Abuse of Functions 
Trading in influence refers to a corrupt trilateral relationship in which a person who has real 
or apparent influence on the decision-making of a public official or body exchanges this 
influence for a bribe.50 UNCAC calls upon states to criminalise this practice.51 This provision 
is not mandatory, but it is important in relation to PEPs because they hold prominent public 
positions that can enable them to act as peddlers of influence. For example, in 2014 the 
former president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, was under investigation for peddling influence 
to a French judge, promising him a prestigious position in exchange for information on the 
corruption investigation into Sarkozy’s 2007 presidential campaign.52 
Abuse of functions covers acts and omissions by a public official in breach of duty to secure 
an undue advantage.53 The relevant UNCAC provision is not mandatory because of the 
                                                          
48 Equatorial Guinea: President Obiang’s PR Overhaul, available at 
http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/equatorial-guinea-president-teodoro-obiang-legitimization-
corruption-oil-unesco-eiti-dodd-frank (accessed on 23 August 2015). 
49 World Bank case summary Ferdinand Marcos, available at http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-
cases/node/18501 (accessed on 15 August 2015). 
50 Terracino (2012) 124. 
51 Article 18 of UNCAC. 
52 France’s President Sarkozy put under investigation-BBC News, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28122473(accessed on 15 August 2015). 
53 Article 19 of UNCAC. 
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controversy about what constitutes the offence.54 The offence is a safety net to cover 
corrupt practices that do not fall under any other corruption offence.55 What is more, the 
broad scope of this offence will assist in prosecuting PEPs who perform any corrupt act in 
breach of their duty. States parties, therefore, must consider seriously criminalising abuse of 
functions in their domestic regimes. 
 
2.4.4 Illicit Enrichment 
The offence of illicit enrichment entails the possession of unexplained wealth by a public 
official.56 UNCAC calls upon states parties to consider establishing this offence, subject to 
the constitutional and fundamental principles of their domestic system.57 Criminalising illicit 
enrichment is a very powerful anti-corruption tool. It considers the clandestine nature of 
corruption, and the evidential challenges faced by the prosecution.58 However, many 
scholars raise objections that the offence violates the right against self-incrimination, plus 
the presumption of innocence, and shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the 
accused.59 
Be that as it may, the crime is especially relevant to corrupt PEPs, who go to great lengths to 
hide their corrupt activities.60 The existence of the offence in domestic legislation will help 
solve the current challenges in prosecuting PEPs.61 It should be noted that illicit enrichment 
works well with assets disclosure systems.62 For example, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, former 
governor of Bayelsa State in Nigeria, was found guilty of making false assets declarations. 
Since his disclosed assets did not match the assets which he actually owned, the situation 
provided evidence of illicit enrichment.63 
 
                                                          
54 UNCAC Legislative Guide (2012) 270& 292. 
55 Terracino (2012) 128. 
56 Article 20 of UNCAC. 
57 UNCAC Legislative Guide (2012) para 297. 
58 Terracino (2012) 116. 
59 Babu (2006) 15, Carr (2007) 233, Snider & Kidane (2007) 728-729. 
60 FATF (2011) 34. 
61 Tayo (2013) 58-60. 
62 UNODC (2015) 9. 
63 Federal Republic of Nigeria v Santolina Investment Corporation & Others [2007] EWHC 3053. 
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2.4.5 Money Laundering 
It is typical for a corrupt PEP to find means to disguise the origin of illicit funds, because such 
funds attract law enforcement attention. Hence, money laundering is the next step for the 
PEP who has committed a corruption offence.64 Recognising the connection between money 
laundering and corruption,65 it is not surprising that UNCAC contains anti-money laundering 
provisions. 
Money often is laundered by such means as front men and corporate vehicles, usually under 
the name of close associates and family members.66 For example, Joyce Oyebanjo, an 
associate of former Nigerian Governor Dariye, was convicted in the United Kingdom of 
assisting Dariye in retaining criminal proceeds.67 In the Abacha case, Abubakar Bagudu, a 
close associate of General Abacha’s oldest son, facilitated laundering embezzled funds from 
the Bank of Nigeria through false security expenditures.68 
The Convention requires states parties to prevent money laundering by establishing a 
comprehensive regulatory and supervisory regime for financial institutions and other bodies 
susceptible to money laundering.69 This includes implementing AML standards such as 
customer due diligence, beneficial owner identification, record keeping, monitoring cash 
movements and reporting suspicious activities.70 Furthermore, UNCAC requires each state 
party to adopt legislative measures and other measures to criminalise the conversion, 
transfer, concealing or disguising of illicit property or proceeds of crime.71 
 
                                                          
64 FATF (2011) 34. 
65 UNGA A/RES/57/244 7 February 2003. 
66 De Willeboiset al (2011) 62,67 & 208. 
67 StAR Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative-Corruption Case- Sani Abacha, available at 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18574 (accessed on 14 August 2015). 
68 See Monfrini (2008). 
69 Article 14 of UNCAC. 
70 Article 14(1) (a) of UNCAC. 
71 Article 23 of UNCAC. 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
2.5 Enhanced Scrutiny 
UNCAC obliges states parties to put in place measures that require financial institutions to 
conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts with substantial links to PEPS.72 This provision 
encompasses conducting enhanced due diligence (EDD) as required by AML procedures for 
individuals identified as PEPs. Likewise, reasonable steps should be taken to determine the 
identity of beneficial owners of the funds deposited into potential PEP accounts. 
The rationale of enhanced scrutiny is to mitigate the risk posed by PEPs by detecting 
suspicious transactions on their accounts.73 Such suspicious activities must be reported to 
the competent authorities, such as an FIU.74 This not only will intercept the transfer of the 
proceeds of corruption from the victim state, but also alert the receiving state about the 
corrupt nature of the particular assets. 
In order to implement this PEP requirement, states parties are required to take legislative 
and administrative measures in their domestic frameworks. These include: Issuing advisories 
on the type of persons (natural and legal persons) to be subjected to enhanced scrutiny, 
plus accounts and transactions that require particular attention.75 This obligation may be 
fulfilled by the government itself or through its designated supervisory bodies.76 Given the 
fact that the laundering methods are constantly evolving, advisories may be issued on the 
basis of identified patterns constructed from suspicious transaction reports, as well as from 
the expert views of the gatekeepers.77 Advisories should be issued by the FIU or any other 
body dealing with money laundering. 
Government plays a key role in helping financial institutions to identify customers who are 
PEPs, and to apply appropriate regulatory measures.78 In this regard, government must 
notify financial institutions about the identification of persons who fall under the PEP 
requirements.79 Governments have this duty because they are in the best position to 
                                                          
72 Article 52(1) of UNCAC. 
73 FATF (2012) 9. 
74 UNCAC Technical Guide (2009) 193. 
75 Article 52(2)(a) of UNCAC. 
76 UNCAC Technical Guide (2009) 193. 
77 UNCAC Technical Guide (2009) 193. 
78 AU High Level Panel Report (2015) 84. 
79 Article 52(2)(b) of UNCAC. 
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provide financial institutions with a list of PEPs.80 Surprisingly, governments are not active in 
drawing up PEP lists and even where such lists exist they tend to identify foreign PEPs while 
excluding domestic PEPs. This is contrary to the PEP obligations under UNCAC. 
States parties must ensure also that financial institutions maintain records on PEPs and their 
accounts over time.81 This applies to information relating to the identity of the customer 
and the beneficial owner of such accounts.82 Furthermore, states parties need to take 
measures against the establishment of shell banks83 which are used widely to hide assets, 
especially among PEPs.84 
 
2.6 Financial disclosures 
Financial disclosures can serve as a mechanism to deter corrupt practices among public 
officials.85 Accordingly, UNCAC calls upon states parties to establish financial disclosure 
systems for appropriate public officials.86 However, this is not a mandatory requirement. 
With regard to PEPs, financial disclosure plays an essential role as an identification and 
monitoring process.87 For example, transactions that are not in line with what the PEP 
declared can be used as a starting point for further inquiry as to whether the transaction 
involves funds from a legitimate source.88 
Financial disclosures can be used for managing PEPs in various ways. On one hand, 
disclosure systems can be used to obtain a list of PEPs, their close associates and family 
members.89 On the other hand, regulatory authorities can assess banks on how they use 
disclosure forms in addressing risk. Additionally, FIUs can use the financial disclosure 
information for improving the analysis of STRs.90 
                                                          
80 UNCAC Technical Guide (2009) 197. 
81 Article 52(3) of UNCAC. 
82 Article 52(3) of UNCAC. 
83 Article 52(4) of UNCAC. 
84 FATF (2004) & FATF (2011). 
85 Burdescuet al (2009) 3. 
86 Article 52(5) of UNCAC. 
87 See Rossi et al (2012). 
88 FATF (2012) 26. 
89 StAR (2012) 81. 
90 StAR (2012) 81. 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
UNCAC acknowledges that the design and implementation of financial disclosure systems 
depend on the domestic environment, and thus gives discretion to individual states 
parties.91 A UNODC study conducted in 2012, however, notes that the effectiveness of any 
disclosure system “depends on the right questions being asked and addressed at the right 
moment”.92 The same applies to the design of disclosure systems to be used in regulating 
PEP criminality. The questions in disclosure forms must address the risk posed by PEPs and 
when such information is obtained a timely response is needed. In that respect, trained 
personnel and resources must be in place to use the financial disclosure system effectively 
as part of a PEP management strategy. 
 
2.7 Recovering Stolen Assets 
A PEP management regime is not complete without measures to trace and recover stolen 
assets. Asset recovery is a necessary response to corrupt PEPs stripping national resources 
for personal advantage.93 Through asset recovery the victim state is able to retrieve assets 
lost to corruption and deprive offenders of the profits of their crimes.94 Asset recovery is a 
fundamental principle of UNCAC.95 Accordingly, states parties are required to co-operate 
with and assist one another in the recovery of proceeds of corruption. 
UNCAC requires states parties to establish comprehensive asset recovery regimes in their 
domestic systems.96 For instance, states parties must subject to confiscation not only 
primary but also secondary proceeds of crime, such as bank interest.97 In addition, they 
must provide for confiscation of income and other benefits derived from criminal 
proceeds.98 Furthermore, states parties are to establish a legal apparatus for the 
identification, tracing and freezing, and seizure of criminal proceeds.99 
                                                          
91 UNCAC Legislative Guide (2012) para 700. 
92 StAR (2012) 2. 
93 Simser (2010) 322. 
94 Vlassis & Gottwald (2008) 354. 
95 Articles 2(e)(g) & 51 of UNCAC. 
96 Article 31(1)& Article 31(4)-(6) of UNCAC. 
97 UNCAC Technical Guide (2009) 95-96. 
98 Article 31(6) of UNCAC. 
99 Article 31(2) of UNCAC. 
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In most jurisdictions confiscation of assets is based on a criminal conviction.100 However, 
there are situations where it is not possible to obtain a criminal conviction.101 For example, 
immunities can shield corrupt PEPs from prosecution, as in the case of Pinochet.102 Likewise, 
the death of the defendant, lack of evidence and the burden of proof in criminal cases 
undermine the process of recovery of stolen assets.103 
UNCAC requires states parties to consider establishing civil forfeiture for asset recovery.104 
Civil forfeiture has a number of benefits. First, it only requires evidence of the connection 
between the property subject to forfeiture and criminal conduct.105 Second, the standard of 
evidence is lower (no need to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt).106 Third, it is not 
subject to the requirement of dual criminality in the case of an extradition (offence need not 
be a crime in both the requesting and receiving state).107 
The benefits of non-criminal measures for asset recovery offer opportunities for recouping 
stolen assets without having to bring legal action against corrupt PEPs. An effective PEP 
management regime, therefore, must include laws permitting civil forfeiture. This is 
especially important in countries where PEPs commit crimes with impunity. 
 
2.8 FATF Recommendations 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental body involved in the fight 
against money laundering and terrorist financing.108 Over the past two decades, the FATF 
has worked with other international stakeholders to protect the international financial 
system from abuse through its anti-money laundering standards.109 These standards form 
an important part of strategies against corrupt PEPs. 
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FATF standards require states to establish AML/CTF measures. However, the main actors in 
implementing the PEP requirements of these standards are financial institutions and 
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). These are required to apply 
AML/CFT preventive measures when establishing a business relationship with PEP.110 
Furthermore, on-going monitoring should be conducted throughout the business 
relationship.111 For instance, every transaction made by a foreign PEP should be treated as a 
high risk transaction.112 It is important, therefore, for financial institutions and DNFBPs to 
have appropriate measures in place. 
 
2.8.1 Financial Institutions 
For foreign PEPs, in addition to conducting normal CDD measures, financial institutions are 
required to have appropriate risk-management systems to determine whether the customer 
or the beneficial owner is a PEP; obtain senior management approval for establishing or 
continuing such business relationship; take reasonable measures to establish the source of 
wealth and source of funds; and conduct enhanced on-going monitoring of the business 
relationship. Financial institutions should be required to take reasonable measures to 
determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP or a PEP of an 
international organisation.113 
 
2.8.2 Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
Recommendation 22 of the FATF recommendations extends the application of the PEP 
requirements for financial institutions to DNFBPs, which include real estate agents, dealers 
in precious stones and metals, lawyers, notaries, accountants, and trust and company 
service providers.114 
                                                          
110 FATF Recommendations 12 & 22. 
111 FATF Recommendations 12 & 22. 
112 FATF (2012) 9. 
113 FATF Recommendation 12. 
114 Interpretative note to FATF Recommendation 22. 
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Generally, the FATF recommendations require a reporting entity to have an appropriate risk 
management system to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP. This 
includes conducting a risk assessment to understand the risk posed by a particular PEP, and 
the level of enhanced scrutiny needed to mitigate the identified risk.115 Therefore, effective 
implementation of CDD measures affects the ability to determine whether customers or 
beneficial owners are PEPs.116 Any errors in the process may affect the PEP identification 
process and the entire PEP regulation scheme. 
Additionally, reporting entities are required to take adequate measures to mitigate the risk 
of their being used to launder proceeds of corruption and other crimes. One such measure 
is reporting suspicious transactions to the FIU. In reality, the methods of money laundering 
used by PEPs are complex and involve a number of intermediaries. The FATF 
recommendations, therefore, are not sufficient for detecting and deterring corruption. 
Consequently, to deal effectively with corrupt PEPs, a holistic approach is needed, 
combining anti-corruption and anti-money laundering measures. 
 
2.8.3 Other Relevant FATF Requirements 
The FATF requires countries to undertake domestic assessments of the risk of money 
laundering and corruption.117 Such risk assessments will provide insight into how PEPs 
launder their criminal proceeds and the areas vulnerable to corruption. This, in turn, enables 
the country to establish effective measures to address the risk posed by PEPs relative to 
their domestic environment. Furthermore, countries are required criminalise money 
laundering for the widest range of predicate offences and to include corruption and other 
related offences as predicate offences for money laundering.118 
The FATF expects countries to ensure that the ownership, control and administration of 
financial institutions do not fall into the hands of corrupt individuals as these easily can 
assist corrupt PEPs in their criminal activities.119 Moreover, such individuals may be PEPs 
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themselves or associates of PEPs. Further, countries must ensure that legal persons and 
legal arrangements are not used for money laundering purposes by requiring adequate 
information on corporations and their business, as well as on the controllers and 
beneficiaries of trusts.120 
Countries need to take measures to prevent the use of wire transfers and physical cross-
border transfers as means of transferring illicit proceeds. These have been used by family 
members and associates of PEPs to launder proceeds of corruption.121 Countries must 
ensure that wire transfers are accompanied by sufficient information on the originator and 
beneficiary of the transferred money.122 Likewise, cash transfers must leave a trail to 
facilitate tracing any suspicious activities.123 In addition, the FATF requires countries to 
establish FIUs, report STRs, create legal frameworks for asset recovery, and provide 
mechanisms for international co-operation, especially in grand corruption cases because 
such cases usually involve cross-border corruption.124 
 
2.9 Practical challenges 
Some of the problems which may undermine strategies against corrupt PEPs are discussed 
below.  These include the issue of immunities and judicial privileges, bank secrecy laws and 
lack of a uniform definition of a PEP. 
 
2.9.1 Immunities of PEPs 
The issue of immunities plays a crucial part in devising mechanisms for dealing with PEPs 
because immunity is a potential obstacle to prosecution of corruption offenders. Immunity, 
however, is not an unprincipled thing. In fact, the rationale of granting immunities to certain 
public officials is to enable them to exercise their functions without unfounded 
                                                          
120 FATF Recommendations 24 & 25. 
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interference.125 For instance, it is established firmly under international law that heads of 
state, heads of government, and ministers of foreign affairs enjoy personal immunity from 
the jurisdiction of foreign courts.126 
Unfortunately, immunities are abused by corrupt PEPs.127 For example, Joshua Dariye, 
former governor of Plateau State and Nigeria state senator, used his constitutional 
immunity to avoid criminal charges on various corruption offences.128 Immunities also delay 
prosecution efforts. For instance, most PEPs are prosecuted only after leaving office,129 
because they enjoy constitutional immunities that hinder law enforcement agencies in their 
own states from investigating and prosecuting them while in office.130 
Furthermore, immunities may influence foreign law enforcement agencies, including FIUs, 
which have evidence against a PEP but decide not to share such information with authorities 
in the PEP’s country.131 What is more, immunity may cause delays in asset recovery where it 
protects PEPs from assets confiscation.132 
UNCAC is very clear that states parties should establish and maintain an appropriate balance 
between immunities accorded to public officials133 and the public interest in combating 
corruption.134 In practice, most states have failed to strike this balance,135 most likely 
because UNCAC does not prevent states parties from granting excessive immunities, instead 
according them a wide measure of discretion on how to regulate immunities.136 
In addition, PEPs have influence over the adoption of laws that restrict immunities and a 
corrupt PEP is likely to resist any law that ultimately could lead to his prosecution. For 
example, the President of Equatorial Guinea appointed his son as second vice-president, 
thereby granting him immunity, after French authorities opened an investigation against 
                                                          
125 Terracino (2012) 195-204. 
126 See Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) ICJ Rep 2000. 
127 Chaikin & Sharman (2009) 89. 
128 StAR-Stolen Asset Recovery-Corruption Cases-Joshua Dariye, available at 
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him on corruption allegations.137 Without political will, therefore, immunity will continue to 
facilitate impunity. 
 
2.9.2 Bank Secrecy Laws 
Bank secrecy laws are relevant in managing PEPs, especially when it comes to investigating 
and tracing of criminal proceeds.  Although bank secrecy laws are aimed at protecting the 
right to privacy, where these are not well regulated they may hamper anti-corruption 
efforts.138 For example, bank secrecy laws prevented the US Riggs Bank from obtaining 
information on the beneficial ownership of a suspicious account held by the President of 
Equatorial Guinea and his ministers.139 
Hence, PEP management strategies should consider the role of bank secrecy laws. UNCAC 
calls upon states parties to ensure that appropriate measures are available to overcome 
obstacles arising from bank secrecy laws during domestic criminal investigations.140 This 
includes designating what authorities can access bank information, and the circumstances 
and procedures for accessing the information.141 Furthermore, bank secrecy laws ought not 
to undermine asset recovery efforts.142 
 
2.9.3 Variations in the Definition of PEPs 
When dealing with PEPs, countries must ensure that their domestic regimes have a specific 
definition for PEPs. This definition should be in line with the definition contained in the FATF 
recommendations.  Many states, however, have included only foreign PEPs under their 
                                                          
137 StAR Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative-Corruption Case-Teodore Nguema Obiang, available at 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18586 (accessed on 21 August 2015). 
138 Stephenson et al (2011) 58. 
139 Washington Post, 9 September 2004, available at 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/172/30265.html (accessed on 21 August 
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140 Article 40 of UNCAC. 
141 UNCAC Technical Guide (2004) 124-129. 
142 Article 31(7) of UNCAC. 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
domestic regimes. For example, the EU Directives require EDD to be carried out on foreign 
PEPs and PEPs in other European Union member; the same applies to the United States.143 
Allowing states to adopt a narrow PEP definition has a detriment. It creates uneven 
regulation of PEPs internationally which becomes an obstacle to creating a global policy on 
PEPs. Therefore, effective international management of PEPs should begin in their home 
states, because a foreign PEP is actually a domestic PEP in his or her home states. Foreign 
PEPs first use their domestic financial system to export proceeds of crime. Thus, states 
parties to UNCAC and FATF members should adopt a broad definition of PEPs. 
 
2.10 Concluding remarks 
Both UNCAC and the FATF recommendations form an important part of a state’s PEP 
management regime. For years now, the two have operated separately.  However, as 
observed, the combined effect of the two could raise the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
and anti-money laundering measures and, in the long run, produce better results than the 
current individualised approach. Therefore, any effective PEPs management strategy should 
begin with preventing corrupt acts, detecting the movement of corrupt proceeds, and asset 
recovery. This draws attention to measures for managing PEPs and the effectiveness of such 
measures in Tanzanian laws and policies, in the light of the UNCAC obligations and FATF 
recommendations. 
 
                                                          
143 See the EU Directives (2005) and Section 312 of the US Patriot Act, 2001. 
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Chapter Three 
Domestic Legal Measures for Managing PEPs 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Tanzania has taken various measures to combat corruption and money laundering. These 
include: domesticating relevant UN Conventions through legislation; implementing the FATF 
recommendations; joining regional anti-money laundering and anti-corruption groups; and 
co-operation with other countries. This chapter analyses the adequacy of the Tanzania’s 
anti-corruption and anti-money laundering regime in relation to UNCAC and FATF standards, 
with specific focus on the country’s legal strategies against corrupt PEPs. In doing so, the 
chapter begins with a risk assessment of the criminality of PEPs in Tanzania, and then 
proceeds to assess how such risks are addressed. 
 
3.2 Risks Associated with PEPs in Tanzania 
3.2.1 Corruption 
Corruption is among the major sources of criminal proceeds in the country.1 Affected areas 
include public procurement, foreign aid assistance, public finance and the mining industry.2 
In the last decade, high ranking government officials, senior politicians, heads of public 
institutions and judges have been identified in a number of corruption incidents.3 There are 
no reports of foreign PEP involvement in domestic corruption scandals, but this does not 
mean that such individuals pose no risk to the country. 
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3.2.2 Money Laundering 
Money laundering activities are divided into two patterns: money laundering outside the 
financial system and money laundering through the financial system. PEPs use the same 
channels as those used by other money launderers, but in many cases seek the assistance of 
their family members and associates. 
Laundering money outside the financial system involves direct channelling of criminal 
proceeds into real estate, insurance, hawala money transfers and cash intensive businesses 
such as foreign currency exchange bureaux and casinos.4 Money laundering through the 
financial system involves the use of intermediaries, banks, formal money transfer services, 
shell corporations, religious channels and other financial institutions to transfer money 
within the domestic financial system or the international financial system.5 
The Tanzanian economy is dominated by cash transactions. Hence, proceeds of crime are 
mostly in cash form. The dominance of cash in the economy means that it is difficult to 
identify the money trail and, therefore, it is challenging to combat internal laundering 
activities. It is, however, possible to detect and trace illicit money received from other 
jurisdictions or exported to other jurisdictions as these utilise the country’s weakly 
regulated financial system. In any case, there are no reports of foreign PEPs or PEPs of 
international organisations using the Tanzanian financial system to launder money. 
The Bank of Tanzania corruption scandal demonstrates well the criminality of PEPs in 
Tanzania. The former governor of the Central Bank orchestrated a money laundering 
scheme that cost the country a lot of money.6 The laundered proceeds were obtained from 
embezzled state accounts. One of the companies implicated in this scheme was an offshore 
shell company called TANGOLD. Its management was composed entirely of Tanzanian 
cabinet ministers and the Central Bank senior staff. They were alleged to be the beneficial 
owners of illicit money. Money transferred from the Central Bank went through multiple 
jurisdictions in numerous bank accounts held in different jurisdictions. The former governor 
                                                          
4 Bagenda (2003) 52. 
5 Bagenda (2003) 52. 
6 StAR-Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative-Corruption Cases, available at 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18612 (accessed on 25 September 2015). 
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was removed from office pending investigation of the case. Only a handful people have 
been prosecuted thus far, but none of the PEPs implicated has faced any kind of charges. 
 
3.3 Legal Measures 
3.3.1 The PEP Definition 
The AML Act defines a PEP as a “foreign individual entrusted with prominent public 
functions”.7 This definition means that a PEP is somebody who holds a high-level public 
function, but is not a citizen or resident of Tanzania. In other words, only foreign PEPs are 
regulated under the national laws. 
The exclusion domestic PEPs means that the scope of domestic measures is narrow 
compared to what is required under UNCAC and the FATF recommendations. UNCAC makes 
no distinction between domestic and foreign public officials. Furthermore, in 2012 the FATF 
required financial institutions to apply risk mitigation measures to both domestic and 
foreign PEPs.8 
There is clearly an implementation gap. Indeed, in the Tanzanian context, domestic PEPs can 
be considered riskier than their international counterparts, as evidenced in the grand 
corruption incidents experienced in the country. What is more, Tanzania has made no 
reservation to article 52 of UNCAC, thus the county is violating its international obligations. 
It is illogical to exclude domestic PEPs from the risk mitigation measures. Accordingly, the 
government ought to enact legislation that applies the PEP requirements to domestic PEPs, 
their family members and close associates. Lessons can be drawn from South Africa, where 
the PEP requirements apply to both domestic and foreign PEPs.9 
Likewise, the law makes no specific reference to the application of the PEP requirement to 
family and close associates. It should be assumed that they are included in the definition as 
                                                          
7 Section 3 of the AML Act. 
8 See FATF Guidance on PEP (2013). 
9 Financial Intelligence Centre, Guidance Note 3A para 25. 
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required by the FATF recommendations, even though they are not mentioned specially in 
the law. There is a need, however, to deal with such persons expressly so as to avoid 
ambiguity. Again, South Africa law is instructive in making specific reference to family 
members and close associate, with an elaborate explanation of what kind of persons fall 
within this category.10 
 
3.3.2 Application of PEP Requirements 
The PEP requirements are contained in the AML Act, the AML regulations and the FIU 
guidelines. The legal obligation to implement the PEP requirements lies on the reporting 
persons. These include financial institutions and DNFBPs such as legal professionals, 
insurers, accountants, real estate agents and operators of gaming activities.11 
The AML Act provides that reporting persons are required to have an appropriate risk 
management system to determine whether a customer is a PEP.12 This includes putting in 
place customer acceptance policies and procedures for customers holding public and high 
profile positions.13 However, this provision does not apply to beneficial owners and thus is 
contrary to UNCAC which requires reasonable steps to be taken to determine the identity of 
the beneficial owners of funds deposited into accounts held by persons in prominent public 
positions and those associated with them.14 
Furthermore, there is a specific obligation on financial institutions to obtain senior 
management approval to establish a business relationship with a PEP.15 However, there is 
no requirement to obtain senior management approval to continue a business relationship 
where a customer or beneficial owner becomes a PEP at later stage. 
In addition, reporting persons are required to take reasonable steps to establish the source 
of wealth and funds of customers identified as PEPs. A specific guideline requires banking 
                                                          
10 Financial Intelligence Centre, Guidance Note 3A para 25. 
11 Section 3 of the AML Act. 
12 Section 15(1)(b)(i) of the AML Act. 
13 FIU Guideline No 1 para 1.9(c). 
14 Article 52(1) of UNCAC . 
15 Section 15(1)(b)(ii) of the AML Act. See also FIU Guideline No 2 para 3.10. 
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institutions to have policies that require EDD for transactions with PEPs.16 Here, again, the 
requirement does not apply to beneficial owners identified as PEPs. 
It is mandatory for reporting persons to conduct on-going monitoring of customers 
identified as PEPs.17 The purpose of such monitoring is to identify when the client has made 
a transaction that might include proceeds from corruption and other predicate offences. 
This is done in order to block the possible use of that bank for money laundering. 
Furthermore, banking institutions must create their own internal procedures to detect and 
report potential money laundering activities.18 
Where a bank considers that a PEP account is suspicious, it is required to file a STR with the 
FIU.19 What is more, the law provides sanctions for non-compliance with the PEP 
requirements.20 This is in line with the FATF Recommendations. However, the available 
sanctions are not followed in practice and compliance remains a huge challenge. 
 
3.3.3 Duration of PEP status 
The FATF has made no provision for a time limit for the PEP status.21 It is impractical to put a 
time limit on the PEP status because, in reality, the criminality of PEPs can continue years 
after they have left office.22 Likewise, the law in Tanzania is silent on time limits for the PEP 
status. This means that reporting persons are required to apply a risk-based approach to 
determine whether the PEP requirements should be applied to a former PEP. 
 
3.3.4 Limitations 
Generally, the PEP requirements under Tanzanian law are inadequate because they exclude 
beneficial owners, domestic PEPs and family members and close associates. What is more, 
                                                          
16 FIU Guideline No 2 para 2.4. 
17 FIU Guideline No 2 para 3.2. 
18 Guideline No 2 para 2. 
19 Section 17 of the AML Act. 
20 Sections 17(4) & 19A of the AML Act. 
21 FATF Guidance on PEPs (2013) 12. 
22 Greenberg et al (2010) 31. 
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even the provisions on foreign PEPs are insufficient and vague due to the lack of elaborate 
guidelines. The danger of this is that variations arise in the extent of applicability of the PEP 
requirements.  Tanzania can learn from the South African approach in dealing with PEPs. 
Guidance Note 3A of the FIC has three paragraphs dedicated to defining PEPs and describing 
measures to deal with them.23 
The PEP requirements are limited to a number of institutions. There are no guidelines 
addressing AML/CFT measures in most of DNFBPs. Although various DNFBPs are regulated 
by different bodies relevant to the specific industry, there is no designated authority to 
monitor and supervise DNFBPs for AML/CFT purposes. Consequently, there is no designated 
supervisory or regulatory authority to ensure that DNFBPs comply with their obligation to 
apply the PEP requirements as provided under the AML Act. What is more, real estate 
agents are not regulated and thus are attractive for corrupt PEPs to launder money through 
purchasing property. 
Furthermore, there are no sanctions for non-compliance with the PEP requirements. For 
example, although the FIU has issued guidelines that specifically require financial 
institutions to implement the PEP requirements these guidelines have no legal force 
because they are not enforceable in court. Sanctions, however, may be imposed for failure 
to file STRs. 
 
3.4 Other AML Measures 
3.4.1 Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements 
The Companies Act is the main statute that governs the creation of companies and the 
registration foreign companies in Tanzania.24 For a company to be registered in Tanzania, 
certain basic information must be submitted to the Business Registration and Licencing 
Agency (BRELA). This includes the name and address of the company and its shareholders, 
and particulars of the directors.25 Also, companies are required to keep a record of 
                                                          
23 Financial Intelligence Centre, Guidance Note 3A para 25-27. 
24 See Companies Act No 12 of 2002. 
25 Section 14(2) & (3) of the Companies Act. 
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shareholders and the number of shares they hold.26 Company information is available to the 
public to facilitate easy accessibility in case of investigation.27 While these legal provisions 
indirectly aim at defeating the misuse of legal persons for criminal activities, they are not 
adequate in terms of the FATF standards.28 
The Companies Act allows holding of shares through a nominee.29 Such shares can be held 
on behalf of a person without the need to disclose the identity of the true holder of the 
shares or the number of shares. This provision can be utilised by corrupt PEPs to hide 
criminal proceeds in the names of their family members and close associates. In addition, 
companies may issue share warrants for bearer shares.30 Unfortunately, PEPs can misuse 
bearer shares for money laundering as there are no measures to prevent such misuse. 
The law of trusts is based on the common law, but there are no legal measures to prevent 
the use of trusts for money laundering.31 As a result, there are no measures that require the 
disclosure of beneficial owners of trusts or that require the registration of trusts.32 This 
weakness may provide opportunities for corrupt PEPs to use trusts as vehicles for money 
laundering and corruption. 
Generally, there are no express measures under Tanzanian law to ensure that corrupt PEPs 
do not use corporate vehicles and legal arrangements for money laundering purposes. The 
legal obligation is placed on reporting persons, such as lawyers and accountants, to ensure 
that they apply the PEP requirements as their services are used widely in the establishment 
of companies and trusts.33 
 
                                                          
26 Section 115 of the Companies Act. 
27 Sections 118, 210(6) & 458of the Companies Act. 
28 FATF Recommendation 24. 
29 Section 20 of the Companies Act. 
30 Section 85 of the Companies Act. 
31 ESAAMLG (2009) 36. 
32 Section 122 of the Companies Act. 
33 Section 15(1)(b)(i) of the AML Act. 
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3.4.2 Cash Smuggling 
Persons entering or leaving Tanzania must declare all cash to the custom authority.34 Failure 
to declare attracts a sanction.35 However, insufficient controls at airports, ports and border 
check points provide loop-holes for smuggling cash in and out of Tanzania. Corrupt PEPs 
may utilise this weakness for money laundering purposes. 
 
3.4.3 Shell banks and Corresponding Banks 
Tanzanian laws require that all banks and financial institutions be licensed by the Central 
Bank.36 The process of licensing involves a number of checks conducted by the Central Bank 
to satisfy itself of the legitimacy of the requesting entity and to prevent the establishment of 
shell banks in Tanzania. A licence may be revoked where it is discovered that the institution 
used misleading information in its application.37 
Banks are prohibited from establishing a relationship with correspondent banks until the 
Bank of Tanzania gives approval, after having satisfied itself that the entity is a reputable 
institution.38 This requirement minimises the possibility of transacting with a shell bank. This 
measure notwithstanding, FBME, a bank headquartered in Tanzania but conducting ninety 
per cent of its business in Cyprus, in 2014 was declared an institution of money laundering 
concern in the United States.39 A report by FinCEN revealed that the bank’s client base was 
composed largely of offshore businesses and high net worth individuals, including PEPs.40 
This case poses concerns about shell banks operating in Tanzania. 
 
                                                          
34 Section 23(1) of the AML Act. 
35 Sections 23(5) & 28B of the AML Act. 
36 Sections 6 & 7 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act No 5 of 2006. 
37 Section 11(3)(d) of the BFI Act. 
38 Regulation 26 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Regulations of 1997. 
39 FinCEN Takes Action to Protect U.S Financial System, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/html/20140716.html (accessed on 28 September 2015). 
40 The downfall of FBME Bank, available at http://www.legalfloris.com/the-downfall-of-fbme-
bank(accessed on 28 September 2015). 
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3.5 Criminalisation Measures 
3.5.1 Bribery 
Tanzania has criminalised the active bribery of national public officials in full and passive 
bribery in part.41 The law adopts a strict approach by prohibiting the offering and receiving 
of any advantage undue advantage.42 The undue advantage, however, must be 
accompanied by a corrupt intention. The law also criminalises active and passive bribery of 
foreign public officials and officials of public international organisations.43 There are no 
reports of bribery involving foreign public officials or officials of public international 
organisations.44 
A person convicted of bribery may be sentenced to “a fine of not less than five hundred 
thousand shillings, but not more than one million shillings or to imprisonment for a term of 
not less than three years but not more than five years or to both”45 The monetary penalties 
for bribery may be sufficient for petty corruption but are lenient for grand corruption. This is 
because usually the penalties are far less than the amount of money stolen by a corrupt 
PEP. 
The following example illustrates bribery of national public officials in public procurement. 
British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) sold radar for an inflated price. An investigation by the 
British Serious Fraud Office (SFO) revealed that bribes were paid to senior government 
officials, including the then Attorney General and governor of the Central Bank.46 The 
government took administrative action, but no legal action was taken against the implicated 
PEPs. 
 
                                                          
41 Section 15 of the PCCA; Sections 21-23 of the Election Expenses Act No 6 of 2010. 
42 Section 15 of the PCCA. 
43 Section 21(1)(2) of the PCCA. 
44 UNCAC Tanzania Self-Assessment Report (2012) 6. 
45 Section 15(2) of the PCCA. 
46 StAR-Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative-Corruption Cases, available at 
https://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18605 (accessed on 25 September 2015). 
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3.5.2 Embezzlement, Misappropriation and Diversion 
Acts of embezzlement, misappropriation and diversion of public funds or property are 
criminalised under Tanzanian law.47 In the case of embezzlement, however, the law is only 
partially compliant with UNCAC as it does not include embezzlement for the purpose of 
benefiting a third party.48 The penalties for embezzlement are a fine of not more than ten 
million shillings or a prison term not exceeding seven years or both.49 The penalties for 
diversion are a fine not exceeding two million shillings and a prison term not exceeding two 
years or both.50 The court also may order the confiscation of property or payment of 
embezzled or diverted funds.51 
Incidents of embezzlement are worse where a corrupt PEP has influence or control over a 
financial institution or public entity. The following incident demonstrates how corrupt PEPs 
have exerted their influence to commit crimes. The former governor of the Central Bank 
used his official position to embezzle money from state accounts into various entities. On 
one occasion the governor added extra costs for the construction of the Bank’s office that 
increased the construction budget from$73 million to $357 million. These extra costs were 
never explained.52 Also, the governor channelled funds from the Central Bank into several 
off-shore shell companies,53 and he was involved in the illicit transfer of 133 billion shillings 
from the External Arrears Account into twenty two fictitious companies.54 Five cases are 
currently in court relating to these allegations of embezzlement.55 
 
                                                          
47 Sections 28 & 29 of the PCCA; Sections 120 & 319 of the Penal Code. 
48 Sections 28(1) of the PCCA. 
49 Sections 28(1) of the PCCA. 
50 Sections 29 of the PCCA. 
51 Sections 28(3) of the PCCA. 
52 Tanzania Affairs-Corruption Cases-The Latest, available at http://www.tzaffairs.org/2010/01/corruption-
cases-%E2%80%93-the-latest (accessed on 27 September 2015). 
53 StAR-Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative-Corruption Cases, available at 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18612(accessed on 27 September 2015). 
54 CAG Report (2005/2006) 8. 
55 Tanzania: Five ‘High-Profile’ Embezzlement Cases Pending in Court, available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201501301517.html (accessed on 27 September 2015). 
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3.5.3 Abuse of Functions 
The offence of abuse of position covers any person, whether a public official or not.56 For 
that reason, the Tanzanian legal provision is broader than that in UNCAC. The penalties for 
the offence include a fine not exceeding ten million shillings or imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding seven years or both.57 
This provision has been put into practice in the case of Republic v Basil Mramba.58 Basil 
Mramba and his co-accused Daniel Yona were Minister of Finance and Minister for Energy 
and Minerals respectively. By virtue of their positions, they granted a tender to an auditing 
firm called Alex Stewart Assayers in violation with section 123 of the Public Procurement Act 
of 2004. Furthermore, they granted an unlawful tax exemption to the said corporation. As a 
result the government lost 11752350148 shillings. The two were convicted and sentenced to 
three years imprisonment and a fine of five million shillings. 
 
3.5.4 Trading in Influence 
Both active and passive trading in influence are criminalised under Tanzanian law.59 In 
addition, trading in influence is prohibited specifically in public procurement.60 This is 
compliant with the UNCAC provision. The penalty for active peddling and passive peddling is 
a fine not exceeding three million shillings or a prison term not exceeding two years or 
both.61 The penalties are lenient compared to the large sums of money PEPs receive as 
bribes to influence decisions. 
However, no cases have been filed under this provision. For that reason, it has never been 
put into practice.62 The following incident demonstrates how corrupt PEPs have exerted 
their influence in public procurement decisions.  In 2006, the Richmond Development 
Company was awarded a tender to supply electricity under direct instruction of the Prime 
                                                          
56 Section 31 of the PCCA. 
57 Section 31 of the PCCA. 
58 Case No1200/2008. 
59 Section 33(1)(2) of the PCCA. 
60 Section 73 of the Public Procurement Act. 
61 Section 33(1)(2) of the PCCA. 
62 UNCAC Tanzania Self-Assessment Report (2012) 9. 
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Minister and two cabinet ministers, despite the company’s failure in the bidding process. It 
was discovered later that the tendering process was irregular and corrupt. No legal action 
was taken against the officials implicated in the scandal, despite allegations of their using 
their influence to secure the tender. 
 
3.5.5 Illicit Enrichment 
Certain public officials cannot own property without giving an account of how he acquired 
that property. The rationale of this requirement is to prevent such public officials from using 
their office to enrich themselves. Accordingly, the government has enacted various laws to 
deal with unexplained wealth. 
The PCCB may require a public official to give a full and true account of property in his 
possession or in the possession of his agent.63 Agents of a public official include family 
members, close associates and any other person acting on behalf of that public official.64 
The PCCB may require further that the public official disclose how he acquired the 
properties in question.65 If the public official fails to comply with this requirement or 
provides a false account, he may face a fine of five million shillings or a prison term not 
exceeding three years both.66 In addition, the Constitution requires members of parliament 
to provide statements of their property and the property of their spouses.67 
The crime of possessing unexplained wealth covers previous and present public officials.68 
This approach is wider than UNCAC’s and takes account of the fact that the criminality of 
public officials does not end when they leave office. Furthermore, the provision covers 
properties held by third parties, including gifts that third parties acquired from the public 
official where there is a close relationship between the official and the third party.69 This 
takes account of how corrupt PEPs use third parties to conceal the true ownership of their 
properties. 
                                                          
63 Section 26(1) of the PCCA. 
64 Section 26(5) of the PCCA. 
65 Section 26(1) of the PCCA. 
66 Section 26(3) of the PCCA. 
67 Art 70(1) Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. 
68 Sections 26 & 27 of the PCCA. 
69 Section 27(2) of the PCCA. 
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The penalty for this offence is a fine not exceeding ten million shillings or imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding seven years or both.70 In addition, the court may order the 
confiscation of the property.71 These penalties reflect the gravity of the offence. Currently 
there are several cases on possession of unexplained wealth under investigation.72 The 
following incident illustrates a case of illicit enrichment involving domestic PEPs and their 
family members. The former president, his family and associates, together with a cabinet 
minister, were accused of purchasing Kiwira coal mine at an astonishingly low price. 
Furthermore, none of public officials disclosed ownership of the mine in their assets 
disclosure forms. This prompted concerns about illicit enrichment.73 No legal action was 
taken against the implicated parties. However in 2009, the government cunningly settled 
the issue by reporting that the former president had withdrawn his shares from the mine.74 
It is not known what happened to the shares held by his family and close associates. 
 
3.5.6 Money Laundering 
Anti-money-laundering provisions are contained in a number of laws in Tanzania.75 
However, the offence of money laundering is provided for specifically under the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act.76 The PCCA also includes a provision that deals with the laundering of 
proceeds of corruption and concealment of proceeds of corruption.77 What is more, this 
provision allows the AG to prevent transfer of corruptly acquired property or advantage, by 
requesting a person who has received or acquired the property or undue advantage not to 
transfer, dispose or part possession with the proceeds of crime.78 A person convicted of 
                                                          
70 Section 27(3) of the PCCA. 
71 Section 27(4) of the PCCA. 
72 UNCAC Country Report (2014). 
73 StAR-Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative-Corruption Cases, available at 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18606 (accessed on 27 September 2015). 
74 This Day Reporter, available athttp://www.thisday.co.tz/?l=10444 (accessed on 27 September 2015). 
75 See section 311 of the Penal Code, sections 71 &72 of POCA, section 12 of the AML Act and section 34 
of the PCCA. 
76 Section 12 of the AML Act. 
77 Section 34(1)(a)(b) of the PCCA. 
78 Section 34(2) of the PCCA. 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
transferring proceeds of corruption is liable to a fine not exceeding ten million shillings or a 
prison term not exceeding seven years or both.79 
Tanzanian law recognises a wide range of predicate offences for money laundering.80 
Additionally, the Minister of Finance may declare any other offence a predicate offence for 
money laundering.81 Moreover, all corruption offences under UNCAC constitute predicate 
offences for money laundering. This is because all corruption and related offences under the 
PCCA constitute predicate offences for money laundering and the PCCA has criminalised all 
corruption offences under UNCAC.82 Questions, however, arise with regard to the offence of 
embezzlement, as this is criminalised partially under the PCCA. Nevertheless, the 
criminalisation of money laundering is largely compliant with UNCAC and the FATF 
recommendations. 
 
3.6 Strategies to Promote Ethics 
As part of the domestic effort to promote transparency, accountability and avoid conflicts of 
interests among PEPs, the government enacted the Public Leadership Ethics Code Act.83 This 
law applies to certain public leaders, including the president, ministers, judges and other 
high-ranking officials, as listed in the Act.84 Essentially, the Act is a code of ethics for PEPs. 
The law requires public officials to provide assets declarations.85 This covers all property or 
assets owned and liabilities borne by the officials, their spouses and unmarried minor 
children.86 Such declarations are made to the Commissioner of Ethics within thirty days after 
taking office and from then on at the end of each year and when the official leaves the 
public office.87 Furthermore, the Ethics Secretariat conducts physical verification of assets 
declared by PEPs. 
                                                          
79 Section 34(1) &Section 34(5) of the PCCA. 
80 Section 3 of the AML Act. 
81 Section 3 of the AML Act. 
82 Section 3(c) of the AML Act. 
83 Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No 13 of 1995. 
84 Section 4 of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act. 
85 Section 6(b)(ii) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act. 
86 Section 6(b)(ii) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act. 
87 Section 9(1)(c) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act. 
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Public leaders are prohibited from soliciting or accepting economic benefit except for 
incidental gifts, customary hospitality or other benefits of nominal value.88 Allowing 
incidental gift and customary hospitality is essential for maintaining good relations, but 
these benefits are vulnerable to being used to disguise bribes.89 Even so, this provision 
serves the objective of preventing bribery among PEPs and other public officials.90 
In general, the ethics code is consistent with UNCAC,91 as it also addresses conflicts of 
interests, nepotism and other corrupt behaviour.92 Moreover, the code is not a toothless 
text, as it provides sanctions for non-compliance, including warnings, cautions, demotions, 
suspensions, dismissals and resignations from office.93 
There is a problem, however, in that some leaders abuse the standards provided under the 
code, as evidenced in scandals involving some PEPs. Furthermore, the lack of prosecutions 
for illicit enrichment raises questions about the effectiveness of the assets disclosure 
requirement. Also, the failure of the Ethics Secretariat to carry out prompt verification of 
the declared property undermines the efficiency of the assets declaration system. 
 
3.7 Public Procurement 
The vulnerability of procurement activities to corruption has influenced the government to 
apply specific measures in the area. The law criminalises corrupt transactions in the 
procurement process.94 Furthermore, to enhance transparency and accountability in the 
procurement process the government requires the procurement to be open.95 These include 
public advertisement of the qualifications of bidders, the selection procedure and the code 
                                                          
88 Section 6(f) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act. 
89 Nsereko & Kebonang (2005) 110. 
90 See Tenga (2010). 
91 Article 8 of UNCAC. 
92 Sections 5 & 6 Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act. 
93 Section 8 of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act. 
94 Sections 16(1)(2) & 17(1)(a)(b) of the PCCA. 
95 See part V of the Public Procurement Act No 21 of 2004. 
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of conduct to which public officials must adhere,96 and the express prohibition of fraud and 
corruption in procurement activities.97 
 
3.8 Assets Forfeiture 
An assets forfeiture regime determines the ability promptly to freeze assets during on-going 
investigations and recover proceeds after prosecution. In this regard, the government has 
instituted laws on forfeiture of criminal proceeds. The provisions on the confiscation, 
freezing and seizing of proceeds of corruption are contained in various laws, including the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau Act, the Economic and Organised Crime 
Control and the Civil Procedure Act (CPA). However, the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) is the 
principal statute when it comes to asset recovery. 
 
3.8.1 Proceeds of Crime Act 
POCA provides for confiscation of property in relation to a wide range of offences. These 
include serious offences such as money laundering and its predicate offences.98 The Act 
covers both instrumentalities and proceeds of crime.99 In addition, foreign forfeiture orders 
can be registered in Tanzania.100 The law requires the return of recovered property to the 
true owner.101 
POCA is therefore in line with UNCAC and the FATF standards.102 The scope of asset 
recovery, however, does not include instrumentalities and properties derived from the 
benefits of the crime. This goes against best practice under UNCAC. In addition, forfeiture is 
                                                          
96 Section 86(1) of the Public Procurement Act. 
97 Sections 72 & 87 of the Public Procurement Act. 
98 Section 3 of POCA. 
99 Section 3 of POCA. 
100 Section 18 of POCA. 
101 Section 36 of POCA. 
102 Article 56 of UNCAC & FATF Recommendation 38. 
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based on a conviction, and thus the court must satisfy itself of the criminal nature of the 
property.103 
 
3.8.2 Other Supporting Legislation 
The PCCA provides for forfeiture of proceeds of corruption,104 but this is subject to a 
conviction.105 Where proceeds cannot be traced, the PCCB may file a request for a pecuniary 
penalty.106 This provision, however, does not state how such order is to be enforced and the 
circumstances in which the order may be filed or obtained.  The Director of the PCCB may 
order immediate freezing illicit property.107 This accords with best practice under UNCAC.108 
There is no civil forfeiture regime for confiscation and forfeiture of proceeds of crime in 
Tanzania, with the exception of property associated with a terrorist group.109 
The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act includes provisions for mutual legal 
assistance in the enforcement of external forfeiture orders, and penalties.110 Furthermore, 
the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act includes provisions on forfeiture of 
instrumentalities of crime.111 
 
3.9 PEP Measures in the Judicial Services 
The Tanzanian judicial services are perceived as the second most corrupt sector in the 
country.112 Such perceptions about the protector of the rule of law threaten the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Moreover, the presence of corrupt officials 
in the judiciary undermines the role of courts in combating corruption. 
                                                          
103 Section 9(1) & 14(1) of POCA. 
104 Section 40(1) of the PCCA. 
105 Section 40(2) of the PCCA. 
106 Section 40 of the PCCA. 
107 Section 12 of the PCCA. 
108 Article 31(2) of UNCAC. 
109 Section 43(1) of the PTA. 
110 Section 30 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act No 24 of 1991. 
111 Section 23 Economic and Organised Crime Control Act No 13 of 1984. 
112 TI East Africa Bribery Index (2014) 38. 
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The government has taken several measures to deal with this problem. These include 
transparent and merit-based selection of judges,113 conducted in consultation with the 
Judicial Services Commission.114 Additionally, as part of the measures to promote ethics and 
institutional integrity, judges undergo training on adherence to judicial ethics and 
professionalism. For example, 11 high court judges were trained in 2009.115 Judges are 
subject to the Public Leadership Code Act and the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers. 
However, the judiciary is yet to free itself from corruption. For example, in 2014, two high 
court judges were implicated in the escrow scandal for receiving over four hundred million 
shillings.116 
 
3.10 Enforcement Concerns 
3.10.1 Bank Secrecy 
Banks and financial institutions are obliged to keep customer information a secret, unless 
the opposite is required by law.117 Breach of confidentiality and secrecy may result in a fine 
not exceeding twenty million shillings or imprisonment for three years or both.118 Several 
laws provide for circumstances under which the duty of secrecy may be waived. For 
instance, banks and financial institution may share information with law enforcement 
agencies on matters related to money laundering and corruption investigations.119 
With regard to asset recovery, the law requires financial institutions to co-operate with law 
enforcement agencies. For that reason, confidentiality is ruled out as a ground for refusing 
to provide information relating to illicit property. The Inspector General of Police is 
empowered to authorise police officers to investigate suspicious accounts.120 Also, the DPP 
                                                          
113 Article 109(7) of the Constitution. 
114 Section 22 of Judicial Services Act No 2 of 2005. 
115 NACSAP II Implementation Report (2009) 43. 
116 PAC Report (2014) 25. 
117 Section 48(4) of the Banking and Financial Institution Act No 5 0f 2006. 
118 Section 48 (6) of the BFI Act. 
119 Section 12 of the PCCA; Section 21 of the AML Act. 
120 Section 63A(1) of POCA. 
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may apply for a court order to compel the financial institution to provide information about 
an account, including transactions conducted through that account.121 
Failure to co-operate with the police officer may result in a fine not exceeding one million 
shilling or imprisonment not exceeding two years or both.122 A financial institution is subject 
to a penalty where it provides false or misleading information.123 The bank secrecy laws 
therefore are consistent with UNCAC,124 for these laws do not prejudice measures against 
corrupt PEPs. 
 
3.10.2 Immunities 
Domestic PEPs do not enjoy any immunity from criminal prosecution. However, a sitting 
president enjoys absolute immunity for any act or omission committed in the scope of his or 
her official duties.125 This constitutional immunity is a potential legal impediment to 
prosecutions. The president can rely on his or her constitutional immunities to object to any 
proceedings, whether civil or criminal. Nonetheless, the immunity provision complies with 
UNCAC. 
Gaps still exist as regards diplomatic immunities for foreign PEPs and PEPs of international 
organisations. These PEPs may abuse their immunities, for example, by using a diplomatic 
bag to smuggle money.126 Tanzanian laws are silent on this vulnerability. Reports that 
Chinese officials used the president’s plane to smuggle ivory disguised as diplomatic bags127 
raises concerns about the possibility of transferring the proceeds of corruption through 
similar means. 
 
                                                          
121 Section 65(1) of POCA. 
122 Section 63A(3) of POCA. 
123 Section 65(5) of POCA. 
124 Article 30 of UNCAC. 
125 Section 50 of the PCCA, Section 16 of the Penal Code, Article 46 of the Constitution. 
126 Mwenda (2011) 48. 
127 Tanzania Ivory: Chinese Officials ‘Went on buying Spree’-BBC News, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29929423 (accessed on 28 September 2015). 
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3.11 Concluding Remarks 
Tanzania has made considerable efforts to establish a legal framework that is compliant 
with UNCAC and the FATF standards. To a large extent these laws are adequate. The 
problem, however, is that most of the legal provisions remain theoretical because there is 
little effort made to implement the law. This enforcement gap undermines the overall 
objective of the legal measures against corrupt PEPs. Furthermore, there is a notable 
selectivity in the treatment of corrupt PEPs implicated in grand corruption incidents. Even 
though the government has taken considerable action, including cabinet reshuffles and 
administrative measures, these measures have not been effective in deterring corrupt PEPs 
from criminal activities. 
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Chapter Four 
Institutional Framework for Managing PEPs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
UNCAC and the FATF emphasise the need for an effective institutional framework to 
support legal measures and facilitate international co-operation. This includes law 
enforcement agencies, supervisory bodies and sector regulators. Accordingly, this chapter 
endeavours to assess the institutions established under the Tanzanian anti-money 
laundering and anti-corruption regime, with specific focus on the FIU, the PCCB and other 
complementary bodies. 
 
4.2 Financial Intelligence Unit 
The Tanzanian financial intelligence unit (FIU) was established under section 4 of the Anti-
Money Laundering Act. It began operating in 2007 under the Ministry of Finance.1 The FIU is 
the central body in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
 
4.2.1 The FIU and PEP Management 
The FIU works closely with regulators, law enforcement agencies, and reporting persons in 
preventing money laundering. It is empowered to supervise reporting persons for AML/CFT 
compliance.2 This is done through either on-site or off-site supervision.  The FIU may 
request the relevant regulators to conduct supervision in their respective sectors. 
                                                          
1 FIU Report (2012/2013) 4. 
2 Section 6(d) of the AML Act. 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Furthermore, the FIU works with regulators to ensure that reporting persons comply with 
AML laws and the FIU guidelines. For example, in June 2012 the FIU, in collaboration with 
the Directorate of Banking Supervision of the Bank of Tanzania, conducted on-site 
examinations of banking institutions for AML/CFT compliance.3 The process revealed that 
several banks lack comprehensive AML systems, including risk mitigation measures for 
PEPs.4 Subsequently, the FIU obliged them to take quick steps to comply with the law. The 
FIU continues to conduct follow-up in this respect.5 
The FIU is empowered to receive, analyse and disseminate reports and other information 
regarding potential money laundering activities by reporting persons and other sources.6 
These include STRs on suspected money laundering activities. Where the report suggests 
that there are grounds to suspect money laundering, terrorist financing or any other 
criminal activities, the FIU sends an intelligence report to law enforcement agencies such as 
the police and the PCCB.7 Similarly, the law enforcement agencies may request access to 
information collected by FIU when conducting their own investigations. 
The FIU receives STRs primarily from the banking sector8 because this sector is relatively 
well-regulated as compared to other economic sectors. However, less reporting from other 
sectors does not mean that money laundering activities are not present in those sectors. In 
fact, criminals are likely to resort to operating in these poorly regulated sectors. The lack of 
reports, therefore, suggests that money laundering activities go undetected in many areas. 
 
4.2.2 Limitations of the FIU 
The FIU acknowledges that the revision of the FATF recommendations in 2012, which 
included a mandatory obligation to apply the PEP requirements to domestic PEPs, has 
created new challenges.9 This is because reporting persons have not implemented 
effectively yet the previous standards that applied to foreign PEPs. What is more, the FIU 
                                                          
3 FIU Report (2011/2012) 12. 
4 FIU Report (2011/2012) 14. 
5 FIU Report (2012/2013) 10. 
6 Section 4(2) of the AML Act. 
7 FIU Report (2012/2013) 8 
8 FIU Report (2012/2013) 8. 
9 FIU Report (2012/2013) 17. 
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itself is still in the process of revising its action plan so as to comply with the new 
standards.10 
Supervision of some reporting persons for AML compliance is difficult because in some 
sectors there are no designated regulators.11 Even where there is a designated regulator its 
mandate might not include anti-money laundering measures. There are also several 
shortcomings with providing feedback on the outcome of STRs to reporting persons and the 
FIU cannot request information from other law enforcement agencies because there are no 
mechanisms for institutional co-operation and co-ordination. 
The FIU also faces investigation difficulties due to the complex methods and technology 
used in the money laundering process. Moreover, Tanzania’s cash based economy makes 
investigation even more difficult as the laundering process leaves no trail that the FIU can 
follow.12 Other practical challenges include limited resources, lack of expertise and 
difficulties in the exchange of information with other financial intelligence units.13 These 
limitations hinder the effective enforcement of the PEP requirements. 
Lastly, the FIU offices are located in the Ministry of Finance. This close link between the FIU 
and the executive arm of the government undermines its independence and impartiality 
because there are no adequate provisions to safeguard operational autonomy. While a 
certain Chinese wall may exist between the FIU and the ministry, on the face of it such close 
ties undermine the credibility of the FIU in the public eye. This is crucial, especially in a 
country where the executive, although constantly under attack for being corrupt, continues 
with impunity. 
 
4.3 Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau 
The PCCB was established under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.  The Bureau 
is the central body in preventing and combating corruption in the public and private sectors 
                                                          
10 FIU Report (2012/2013) 17. 
11 FIU Report (2012/2013) 17. 
12 FIU Report (2012/2013) 16. 
13 FIU Report (2012/2013) 16. 
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in Tanzania.14 Its mandate includes investigating and prosecuting corruption cases, 
promoting understanding of corruption through public awareness programmes, and co-
operation with domestic and international stakeholders. 
 
4.3.1 The PCCB and PEP Management 
The PCCB is in the front-line of the fight against corruption in Tanzania. Since its 
establishment in 1973, the Bureau has investigated several top-ranking officials and their 
associates, and has initiated proceedings against them on various corruption charges.15 In 
recent years, the PCCB has seen a rise in the number of successful prosecutions.16 For 
example, in July 2015 the PCCB successfully prosecuted two former ministers for abuse of 
power.17 
The PCCB has launched a number of prevention initiatives as part of its implementation of 
the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP). One such initiative is the 
PCCB Annual Anti-Corruption Forum that brings together interested parties to discuss anti-
corruption strategies, challenges and solutions.18 
The PCCB offers training to persons from sectors that are vulnerable to corruption, as part 
of its corruption awareness programme. For example, in 2013 training was conducted for 
members of tender boards from different ministries. The PCCB is also dedicated to research 
on issues of corruption, including ethics, good governance and transparency in the public 
sector. Lastly, the PCCB takes part in international anti-corruption initiatives. For example, in 
2015 it partnered with the UK in work on asset recovery.19 
 
                                                          
14 Section 46 of the PCCA. 
15 See Tanzania Country Self-Assessment (2011). 
16 Statistics, available at http://pccb.go.tz/images/stories/case_statistics/STATISTICS-2018-JUNE2015.png 
(accessed on 28 September 2015). 
17 PCCB-List of Shame, available at http://pccb.go.tz/index.php/list-of-shame (accessed on 28 September 
2015). 
18 Training-NACSAP-Phase II, available at http://www.pccb.go.tz(accessedon 28 September 2015). 
19 UK Partners with PCCB on Asset Recovery, available at http://www.pccb.go.tz (accessed on 28 
September 2015). 
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4.3.2 Limitations of the PCCB 
The PCCB has no power to prosecute corruption crimes, except bribery, without the consent 
of the DPP.20 In practice the process of securing consent to prosecute may be difficult.21 For 
example, from 2005 to 2013 only 894 of the 50733 reported cases of corruption were taken 
to court after the PCCB had obtained the consent of the DPP.22 
The PCCB has been blamed often for reluctance to pursue cases of grand corruption and for 
targeting only the “minor fish”. Furthermore, a number of studies conducted by NGOs 
indicate that the PCCB lacks independence.23 There is a danger of political interference in 
practice because the PCCB’s Director General and the Deputy Director General are 
presidential appointees.24 Regrettably, this affects the Bureau's ability and willingness to 
take corrupt officials to court. 
Like other institutions in Tanzania, the PCCB lacks the resources and skilled staff to pursue 
complex corruption cases.25 These deficiencies affect the ability of the Bureau to deal with 
corruption involving PEPs. Even the Director General of the PCCB acknowledges that such 
grand corruption cases are costly because most of the evidence is scattered across different 
jurisdictions and so the Bureau needs to mobilise resources first.26 The inevitable delays 
lead the public to assume that the Bureau is doing nothing. 
 
                                                          
20 Section 57 of the PCCA. 
21 Why PCCB fails to prosecute grand corruption, available at 
http://www.businesstimes.co.tz/index.php?option=com_content&id=2465:why-pccb-fails-to-prosecute-
grand-corruption&Itemid=57 (accessed on 29 September 2015). 
22 SeeLHRC Corruption Report (2014). 
23 LHRC Corruption Report (2014). 
24 Global Integrity (2010). 
25 LHRC Corruption Report (2014). 
26 Tanzania: PCCB saves sh7.6 billion, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201002260440.html 
(accessed on 29 September 2015). 
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4.4 Other Complementary Institutions 
4.4.1 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
The office of the DPP is a constitutional office with exclusive powers over public 
prosecutions,27 and thus is a key actor in the prosecution of grand corruption cases. To 
safeguard its independence, the office is constitutionally protected from interference.28 
Nevertheless, the dangers of being compromised persist, considering that the DPP is part of 
the executive and works under the Ministry of Justice.  Moreover, the DPP is a presidential 
appointee and thus likely to avoid a case that will jeopardise his or her position. 
Consequently, corrupt PEPs carry on with impunity. 
4.4.2 Attorney General’s Chambers 
As the main actor in asset recovery, the Attorney General’s Chambers established the Asset 
Forfeiture and Recovery Unit under the Division of Public Prosecutions in 2011. Its sole 
function is to deal with assets forfeiture in Tanzania. The Unit currently is implementing the 
Strategic Plan for Asset Forfeiture and Recovery, as part of the attempt to improve the 
domestic asset recovery regime.29 As noted, the Tanzanian asset management and recovery 
regime takes a conviction-based approach and thus the Unit cannot target property without 
securing a conviction. Then, again, most corrupt PEPs have never faced prosecution for their 
actions, undermining the recovery of assets. 
 
4.4.3 Police Force 
The Tanzanian police force serves its traditional function of investigating crimes. Several 
laws provide a wide range powers to the police, including powers to search and seize 
property, powers to investigate accounts and powers to access confidential information. 
The Tanzanian police force also works with Interpol to curb transnational organised crime. 
                                                          
27 Article 59B of the Constitution. 
28 Article 59B(4) of the Constitution. 
29 Strategic Plan for Asset Forfeiture & Recovery (2012-2017). 
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However, practical challenges such as inadequate AML skills and limited technical and 
monetary resources undermine the operational capacity of the police force. What is more, 
the Tanzanian police force has been named as the most corrupt institution in the country.30 
This questions the ability of the police to deal with corrupt PEPs, as such individuals can 
bribe law enforcement officers easily to avoid proper investigation into their criminal 
activities. 
 
4.4.4 Bank of Tanzania 
The Bank of Tanzania is the regulator of the banking industry.31 It formulates and 
implements policies to protect the integrity of the domestic financial system.32 These 
include policies against money laundering. The Bank has the power to issue regulations, 
directions and other related guidelines to financial institutions.33 These are legally 
enforceable and non-compliance attracts penalties and fines.34 The Bank conducts on-site 
inspections to access the internal AML controls of banks. Also, the Bank, in collaboration 
with a foreign supervisory body, may exercise cross-border supervision over a 
corresponding bank relationship between a Tanzanian bank and a foreign financial 
institution.35 
The Bank of Tanzania has been a target for corrupt PEPs.36 A number of corruption and 
money laundering incidents were facilitated by Bank officials.37 This situation calls into 
question the Bank’s supervisory ability and sends a wrong message to other banks. Indeed, 
it is inauspicious that the Bank itself is failing to implement AML/CTF requirements, 
including CDD.  Hence, there is a need for serious efforts to strengthen the internal 
governance of the Bank of Tanzania to ensure compliance with AML/CTF standards and, 
especially, the PEP requirements. 
                                                          
30 LHRC Corruption Report (2014) 235. 
31 Section 5(1) of the Bank of Tanzania Act No 4 of 2006. 
32 Section 7 of the Bank of Tanzania Act. 
33 Section 70(3) of the Bank of Tanzania Act; Sections 33 & 71 of the BFI Act. 
34 Sections 66 & 67 of the BFI Act. 
35 Section 35 of the BFI Act. 
36 See Assad (2011). 
37 Tanzanian Affairs-Corruption Cases, available at http://www.tzaffairs.org/2011/05/corruption-the-latest 
(accessed on 29 September 2015). 
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4.4.5 Public Procurement Regulatory Authority 
The PPRA is a regulator of procurement activities in the public sector.38 It is empowered to 
launch investigations on allegations of corrupt practices in the procurement process.39 In 
addition, it can take appropriate disciplinary measures where, after investigation, it 
concludes that there has been a breach of duty, misconduct or a criminal offence on the 
part of the public official.40 It is doubtful, however, whether the PPRA can enforce 
disciplinary measures against high-ranking PEPs such as cabinet ministers. 
 
4.4.6 National Audit Office 
The National Audit Office is a constitutional office headed by the Controller and Auditor 
General (CAG).41 It conducts audits in ministries, government departments, state-owned 
corporations, institutes and public agencies.42 Through its auditing work, the office has 
identified flaws in internal controls that provide opportunities for corruption and economic 
misconduct, such as diversion, misappropriation of state funds and embezzlement. 
CAG reports have played a central role in unmasking corrupt PEPs. These reports have led to 
the dismissal of several cabinet ministers and have been used as a starting point for further 
investigation and as evidence in courts of law. However, the success, of auditing as a tool 
against corruption depends on the existence of a supportive anti-corruption environment.43 
Therefore, it is important that the government demonstrate full commitment to fighting 
corruption so that the office of the CAG can play its role effectively in implementing the 
strategies against corrupt PEPs. 
 
                                                          
38 Section 5 of the Public Procurement Act. 
39 Section 8 of the Public Procurement Act. 
40 Section 14 of the Public Procurement Act. 
41 Article 143 of the Constitution. 
42 Sections 11 & 12 of the Public Audit Act. 
43 Otalor & Eiya (2013) 124. 
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4.4.7 Permanent Commission of Enquiry and Public Leaders’ Ethics Secretariat 
The Permanent Commission of Enquiry (hereafter PCE) is a constitutionally established 
commission with the mandate to inquire into allegations of abuse or misuse of office by 
public officials, including PEPs.44 After investigating a situation, the PCE makes 
recommendations to the president on appropriate measures to be taken against the 
implicated public official.45 Unfortunately, most of the recommendations made by PCE 
usually are ignored. 
The Public Leaders' Ethics Secretariat is the body with the mandate to inquire into the 
behaviour and conduct of PEPs governed by the Public Leadership Ethics Act.46 Additionally, 
the Ethics Secretariat is the administrative body for the assets disclosures required by the 
Act.47 It faces several challenges linked to its capacity and independence. One of these is the 
inability promptly to verify assets disclosure information and the slow response in dealing 
with unethical public officials. 
 
4.5 Inter-Agency International Co-operation 
In addition to implementing domestic measures against corrupt PEPs, Tanzania is also co-
operating with foreign law enforcement agencies to ensure that the international financial 
system is not abused by PEPS and to facilitate asset recovery. The country, however, is not 
able to participate fully in the international arena due to number practical challenges, 
including the lack of skilled personnel and limited resources and technology, which have 
hampered its ability to assist others.48 Nonetheless, the country has managed to provide 
considerable assistance in the global AML/ACL efforts. 
 
                                                          
44 Article 129(2) & (4) of the Constitution. 
45 Article 129(3) of the Constitution. 
46 Article 132(1) of the Constitution. 
47 Section 19(2)(a) of the Public Leadership Ethics Act. 
48 See UNCAC Country Report (2014). 
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4.6 Concluding Remarks 
The institutional arrangements to implement various legal measures against corrupt PEPs 
are adequate generally. Their overall effectiveness and capacity to deal with the risks posed 
by corrupt PEPs, however, are affected by a number of common challenges. These include 
the lack of resources and skilled staff, as well as political interference. Further, some 
institutions have not made proper use of their potential to combat money laundering and 
corruption. What is more, there is no mechanism in place to enable co-ordination and co-
operation among the relevant institutions and, as a result, there is a lack of coherence in the 
implementation of the PEP requirements. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1 General Conclusion 
The key concept of this study is the need to approach the economic criminality of PEPs by 
using a holistic approach that combines anti-corruption and anti-money laundering 
measures under UNCAC and the FATF standards. Such an approach engenders appropriate 
responses that cover both corruption and money laundering, unlike previous PEP strategies 
that focused on implementing anti-money laundering measures only. 
UNCAC requires states parties to implement measures to prevent and combat corruption, 
including preventive measures, the criminalisation of corruption,1 and asset recovery.2 The 
FATF requires financial institutions and DNFBPs to conduct CDD and EDD when dealing with 
PEPs and persons affiliated to them.3 
This study has observed that the strategies to manage PEPs in Tanzania are partially 
compliant with UNCAC and the FATF standards. An analysis in the legal framework revealed 
that anti-corruption measures are relatively satisfactory. However, several legal gaps give 
corrupt PEPs opportunities to circumvent the law. Additionally, several laws fail to achieve 
their objectives because of serious enforcement gaps. This situation casts doubt on the 
government’s seriousness to fight grand corruption. 
What is more, the fact that the PEP definition does not include domestic PEPs gives senior 
public officials an advantage, as they are not subjected to any enhanced scrutiny. Corrupt 
PEPs use this loophole to launder proceeds of corruption. Domestic PEPs pose more risk 
than the other PEPs and thus should not be exempted from the PEP requirements. 
                                                          
1 Chapters 2 & 3 of UNCAC. 
2 Chapter 4 of UNCAC. 
3 FATF Recommendations (2012). 
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Although the PEP requirements apply to foreign PEPs, they are not well articulated in the 
AML Act, its regulations and relevant guidelines. Reporting persons have used this weakness 
as an excuse for not applying appropriate measures when dealing with PEPs. It is important, 
therefore, that laws clearly define the PEP requirements as contained in UNCAC and the 
FATF standards. 
The analysis of the institutional framework has shown that there exist a considerable 
number of institutions relevant to the fight against corruption and money laundering. 
Unfortunately, these institutions face many challenges, including lack of resources, shortage 
of skilled staff and political interference. Hence the institutional capacity to deal with 
corrupt PEPs is undermined.  In order to function effectively, the relevant institutions need 
to be autonomous, free from political interference and provided with enough financial 
resources and skilled staff. 
Regrettably, the study has revealed that there is no coherence among the relevant anti-
corruption and AML/CFT institutions. For example, the PCCB and the FIU exist in an 
environment in which the anti-corruption regime and anti-money laundering regime are 
separate. Corrupt PEPs take advantage of this lack of co-ordination and even play one side 
off against the other. In fact, where the institutions established for implementing and 
enforcing the law are at odds, the effectiveness of applicable legislation is impaired. 
There have been many grand corruption scandals but few prosecutions of PEPs implicated in 
these scandals. The government focuses on administrative sanctions which have no 
deterrent effect. Indeed, such sanctions imply that PEPs are too valuable to prosecute, and 
represent double standards in the implementation of anti-corruption measures, by targeting 
the “small fish” and leaving the kingpins untouched. 
Tanzania should develop a comprehensive, integrated strategy as a tool against corrupt 
PEPs.  This encompasses taking measures to identify the underlying dynamics of economic 
criminality of PEPs and sector vulnerability, so as to determine the strategy that is most 
effective in mitigating the particular risk posed by PEPs.  Several recommendations in this 
regard are made below. 
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5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 Amend Anti-Money Laundering Laws 
It is proposed that section 3 of AML Act be amended to include domestic PEPs, their family 
members and close associates. Tanzania should consider learning from other jurisdictions, 
such as South Africa, which include domestic public office holders in their PEP definition. 
Also, the PEP requirements should apply not only to customers, but also to beneficial 
owners.  
AML guidelines should be drafted in a comprehensive manner. Lessons can be drawn from 
the South African and the UK guidelines. This will allow reporting persons to understand 
what is required of them when applying the PEP requirements. The guidelines should 
include sanctions for non-compliance to give them the force and weight they currently lack. 
Also, guidelines should be issued to all DNFBPs. 
 
5.2.2 Amend Anti-Corruption Laws 
There is a need to reconsider the penalties and fines under the Prevention and Combating 
of Corruption Act (PCCA). Some are too lenient to deter corrupt PEPs from criminal 
activities. It is important to ensure that anti-corruption laws are punitive enough and have a 
deterrent effect. Also, the provision on embezzlement in the PCCA should be amended to 
reflect article 17 of UNCAC. The law should do away with the agency-principal criterion in 
the definition of bribery. To limit presidential influence on the PCCB, the provisions on the 
appointment and removal of PCCB officials should be amended to specify the term of office. 
 
5.2.3 Civil Forfeiture 
Tanzania should consider the adoption of a civil forfeiture regime for asset recovery. As 
observed, conviction-based asset recovery has produced little result because there have 
been few prosecutions of PEPs. A civil forfeiture regime is therefore essential to recover 
proceeds of crime from PEPs without the need for a conviction. 
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5.2.4 Enhance the Assets Declaration System 
To make assets declarations effective, government should consider developing a well-
structured system of review and verification of assets to ensure that any controlling or 
beneficial interests are detected, so as to account for assets owned by family members and 
close associates on behalf of a PEP. The law should include reasonable procedures on how 
assets declaration information is made available to the public. The assets declaration system 
should be used also in PEP identification. 
 
5.2.5 Strengthen Supervisory Measures 
The Central Bank should strengthen its supervisory functions to ensure that financial 
institutions are implementing the FATF recommendations fully. The Central Bank must 
impose appropriate sanctions on non-compliant institutions. More importantly, the Central 
Bank should strengthen its own internal governance and control measures. 
The FIU should construct and periodically revise a list of PEPs that includes current and 
potential PEPs. This list should be distributed to all reporting persons, the PCCB and other 
relevant institutions. It is recommended that the capacity of the FIU be improved as regards 
staff, financial resources, technological support and training. 
The government should consider establishing designated authorities to monitor and 
supervise DNFPS for AML/CFT purposes. At this juncture, priority should be given to real 
estate because the industry is booming and it poses the risk of being used by money 
launderers to pursue their trade via property purchases. 
 
5.2.6 Political Will 
Measures against corrupt PEPs will be of no account if there is no political commitment to 
enforce them. Successful law needs sustained political will. In this regard, the government 
must commit fully to implementing the measures it has devised against corrupt PEPs. This 
includes senior government officials conducting themselves with integrity, honesty and 
accountability. 
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The government should enact laws that are in line with UNCAC and the FATF and other 
relevant international standards.  It should ensure also that domestic legislation is 
sufficiently stringent, retributive and deterrent.  Further, it should make certain that 
relevant institutions are well staffed, adequately resourced and independent. 
 
5.2.7 Institutional Co-operation 
The government should consider establishing means for facilitating co-ordination between 
the PCCB, the FIU and other complementary bodies. This involves integrating various 
institutions to operate in a cohesive manner. For example, STRs filed with the FIU can be 
used to found investigations into possession of unexplained wealth. This will enhance the 
operation of each institution in implementing its obligations. It is important, therefore, that 
an effective communication mechanism is in place to enable such co-operation in the 
implementation of the PEP requirements. 
 
5.2.8 Public Participation 
The public needs to participate in the strategies against corrupt PEPs, who know the power 
that the public wields in unmasking their criminality.  After all, it is the public that is the 
victim of their crimes. It is important to make assets declaration forms available for public 
scrutiny. While it is necessary to prescribe procedures for accessing such forms so as to 
safeguard the privacy of public officials, such procedures should not be so cumbersome as 
to undermine the underlying objective of fighting crime. Public access is a way for the 
government to identify undeclared assets and false declarations. Also, members of the 
public may be key witnesses in grand corruption cases. However, where there are no 
comprehensive witnesses protection programmes, such witnesses will be discouraged from 
testifying against PEPs. 
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